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For more than four decades Japan has not supported any regional or bilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs) on the premise that they are discriminative in nature and 
undermine the principles of WTO/GATT. However, since 1998 Japan has gradually 
changed its stance and started FTA discussions with Mexico, South Korea and Singapore. 
In fact, during the last six years, FTAs have become an indispensable aspect of Japan’s 
foreign trade policy.  
In these circumstances, this thesis intends to identify the main factors that have 
determined the origins, development and nature of the FTA policy in Japan in order to 
provide a proper understanding of Japan’s contemporary trade policy.  
Most of the previous studies on the subject focus on the certain variables, such as 
the international environment, domestic policy or pressure from business circles as a 
source for such policy change in Japan. However, these studies do not look at any 
specific norms as a possible foundation for political transformation. Bearing in mind this 
shortcoming, in this thesis, it is hypothesized that Japan’s policy changes in favor of 
FTAs occurred as a result of normative changes in its foreign trade policy. Japan adopted 
the norm of discriminative bilateral trade liberalization into its traditional trade policy 
practice, which was based on the principle of non-discrimination. The motivating forces 
for normative changes were the changes in the international environment and domestic 
actors’ interests and interaction. Furthermore, it is argued that Japan was reactive and 
passive in changing its conventional trade policy on FTAs and lagged behind other 
developed states, which have established FTAs. The rationale for its reluctance to 
embrace changes was rooted not only in the structure of Japan’s domestic politics but 
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also in the compatibility of the new norm of discriminative trade liberalization under 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Since joining the ranks of countries who have signed the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 1 in 1955, Japan has been advocating the basic principle of 
GATT, that countries should give other countries equal treatment without any 
discrimination in economic and trade relations (“most favored nation treatment”). 2 
Furthermore, Japan was critical of any regional or bilateral trade agreements (“RTA” and 
“BTA”, respectively) on the premise that they are discriminative in nature and undermine 
the principle of GATT. As a result, until 1998, despite the spread of bilateral and regional 
trading arrangements throughout the globe, Japan remained uninvolved in negotiations 
with respect to BTA or RTA.  
Japan’s criticism of RTAs and BTAs was partly based on its fear of possible 
negative consequences that could result from discriminatory trading practices between 
nations, such as: 
(a) “the danger of discriminatory treatment through sophisticated techniques such as 
substantial tightening of rules of origin; 
(b) the possibility of weakened efforts in the multilateral trading system caused by 
 decreased dependence on extra-regional economies; and 
                                                 
1
 GATT was first signed in 1947 in order to provide an international forum that encouraged free trade 
between member states by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by providing a common 
mechanism for resolving trade disputes. (Center for International Earth Science Information Network, 
Columbia University, Columbia University. http://www.ciesin.org/TG/PI/TRADE/gatt.html,. accessed 17 
October 2005). 
2
 Article 1, GATT. http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf (accessed 17 October 2005).  
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(c) the danger of a substantial increase of trade barriers when expanding the coverage 
area of a RTA or BTA”.3 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
(“FTA”)4 became the “rule of the game” in international trade.5 Japan was a witness to 
bilateral and regional economic agreements during the early 1990s in North America 
(North American Free Trade Agreement, “NAFTA”) and in Europe (European Union, 
“EU”). This encouraged Japan to rethink its trade policy. In addition, other factors, such 
as the difficulties in the negotiation process and reaching agreements under the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the potential damage to Japanese companies due to 
FTAs between other economies, also caused reconsideration of the trade policy in Japan.6 
By 1998, the above factors prompted Japan to begin discussions on the possibility 
of entering into FTAs with Mexico and South Korea. The new interest in bilateral and 
regional trade arrangements led Japan to enter into FTAs with countries such as 
Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia starting from 2002. In addition, Japan reached basic 
agreements on FTA with the Philippines and Thailand and is currently negotiating 
bilateral agreements with South Korea, Indonesia as well as a regional FTA with 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”).  
                                                 
3
 MITI. Tsusho Hakusho: Soron (White Paper on International Trade: General Remarks), 1998, 142. Cited 
in Ogita, Tatsushi. “Japan as a Late-coming FTA Holder: Trade Policy Change for Asian Orientation?” In 
Whither Free Trade Agreements? Proliferation, Evaluation and Multilateralization, edited by Jiro 
Okamoto. Chiba: IDE JETRO, 2003, 219. 
4
 Free Trade Agreement, also known as preferential trade agreement, between two or more states, is an 
agreement in which parties grant tariff preference to each other's suppliers, along with other benefits in 
areas such as government procurement and non-tariff measures, (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, http://www.mft.govt.nz/support/tplu/tradematters/glossary.html (accessed 10 March 2006). 
5
 Itoh, Motoshige. “What Benefit will FTA Bring to the Japanese Economy.” Foreign Press Center/Japan, 
20 April 2004, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=185 (accessed 15 February 2006). 
6
 See for example, Tanaka, Hitoshi. “Can Japan Find a Breakthrough?” Japan Echo 28, No. 1 (2001): 8-14; 
Ogita, Tatsushi. “Japan. The Structure of complete objection.” In Trade Liberalization and APEC, edited 
by Jiro Okamoto. London and New York: Routledge, 2004. 
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Given the above circumstances, although Japan was hesitant to accept bilateral 
and regional trading arrangements up to the end of the 1990s, it thereafter shifted its 
policy stance. Japan began to promote bilateral and regional trade liberalization under 
FTAs while supporting the GATT/WTO-based multilateral trade liberalization. This 
approach towards trade policy was called the “multi-layered” approach.7 
Furthermore, the shift in Japan’s foreign economic policy towards the 
multilayered approach was brought about by normative changes in its trade policy.8  
Since 1955 Japan had followed a policy of strict adherence to Article 1 of GATT, which 
placed the highest priority on non-discriminative trade liberalization. However, in 1999, 
it shifted its emphasis to Article 24 of GATT, which allows discriminatory bilateral and 
regional FTAs.9  In this way, the latter became a new norm for Japan’s trade policy in its 
pursuit of free trade arrangements with East Asian countries and beyond.10 Nevertheless, 
this transformation remained within the purview of WTO/GATT trade principles. 
The aforesaid change not only resulted in a drastic trade policy shift in Japan, but 
also had a great impact on the whole East Asian region.  This is because Japan is the 
second largest economy in the world and the largest trade partner, investor and official 
development assistance (“ODA”) donor in the East Asian region. Further, it is the biggest 
source of import and an important export market for Asian countries. Thus, any drastic 
change in its foreign economic policy is likely to have an impact on the whole region and 
                                                 
7
 METI. ‘The Economic Foundation of Japanese Trade Policy - Promoting a Multi-Layered Trade Policy.” 
August 2000,  
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/g00W021e.pdf (accessed 7 January 2006). 
8
 Norms are “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Krasner, Stephen D. 
“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables.” in International 
Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983, 2).  
9
 Terada, Takashi. “The Making of Asia’s First Bilateral FTA: Origins and Regional Implications of the 
Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement.” Pacific Economic Papers, No. 354, 2006, 24. 
10
 Terada, 2006, 24. 
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influence the foreign economic policy of other Asian countries. According to Munakata, 
“Japan’s decision to negotiate an FTA with Singapore on October 22, 2000, had an 
energizing effect in and outside the region”. 11  For example, it resulted in China’s 
proposal to enter into an FTA with ASEAN. Also, Malaysia and Indonesia began to 
consider FTAs as a tool in their foreign economic policy. In this regard, Dent regards 
Japan’s policy shift towards FTAs as “a key change in approach to trade diplomacy and 
trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region.”12   
Given the above background, it is important to examine the origins of the changes 
in Japan’s foreign trade policy in order to lay the path for its future developments.  While 
it is not within the scope of this dissertation to address these predictive patterns, it is 
nonetheless important to analyze and understand this critical first stage of policy 
evolution with its strategic impacts on overall regional trade. 
 
1.2. Hypothesis of the thesis 
The two central questions to be examined in this thesis are:  
1. Why did Japan change its trade policy from the conventional multilateral to a 
multilayered approach? What were the reasons behind these changes?  
2. What was the character of these policy transformations in response to changes in the 
international environment? 
                                                 
11
 Munakata, Naoko. “Wither East Asian Economic Integration.” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 02-E-007, 
June 2002, http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2002_munakata.htm (accessed 17 February 2006). 
12
 Dent, Christopher M. “Networking the Region? The Emergence and Impact of Asia-Pacific Bilateral 
Free Trade Agreement Projects.” The Pacific Review 16, No.1 (2003): 1-28. Cited in Krauss, Eliss S. “The 
US, Japan, and Trade Liberalization: from Bilateralism to Regional Multilateralism to Regionalism+.” The 
Pacific Review 16, No. 3 (2003): 308. 
 5 
To answer these questions in this thesis, it is hypothesized that Japan’s policy 
changes in favor of FTAs occurred as a result of normative changes in its foreign trade 
policy. Japan adopted the norm of discriminative bilateral trade liberalization into its 
traditional trade policy practice, which was based on the principle of non-discrimination. 
The motivating forces for normative changes were the changes in the international 
environment and domestic actors’ interests and interaction. Furthermore, it is argued that 
Japan was reactive and passive in changing its conventional trade policy on FTAs and 
lagged behind other developed states, which have established FTAs. The rationale for its 
reluctance to embrace changes was rooted not only in the structure of Japan’s domestic 
politics but also in the compatibility of the new norm of discriminative trade 
liberalization under FTAs vis-à-vis traditional trade principles of non-discriminative 
trade. 
 
1.3. Significance of the research 
 The motivation for the choice of this research topic came from the significance of 
current changes in the foreign economic policy of Japan, its interest in regional economic 
integration and its entry into economic partnership agreements, taking into account that 
Japan previously had a negative attitude towards any kind of preferential trade 
arrangements outside the purview of the WTO.  
 During the last six years, FTAs have become an indispensable aspect of Japan’s 
foreign economic policy. For this reason, it is important to identify main factors that have 
contributed to the origins and development of the policy in order to provide an 
understanding of Japan’s contemporary trade policy. Some studies look at the changing 
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international environment as well as domestic economic structural problems as main 
causes for the trade policy shift.13 However, these studies do not take into consideration 
Japan’s domestic politics and fail to explain how the changes occurred. Other studies 
emphasize the importance of pressure from Japanese business circles which sought 
guaranteed market access and investment protection.14 However, these studies are limited 
only to case studies where pressure from Japanese industries was exercised and 
overlooked other cases where business had little interests and benefits.  
Moreover, considering Japan’s reluctance to embrace a new trade policy in the 
end of 1990s and the limited economic benefits of Japan’s existing FTAs, in some 
studies, Japan’s policy is regarded as being reactive by nature.15  The most common 
explanation for this is the fragmented character of Japanese policy-making, where the 
absence of a common position on an issue among different governmental bodies delays 
decisive actions. 16  However, there has been no comprehensive study conducted to 
examine this problem from the normative perspectives: how the new norm of 
discriminative trade liberalization was congruent with the domestically embedded norm 
of non-discriminative trade. This also determined the character of Japan’s trade policy. 
                                                 
13
 See for example, Munakata, Naoko. “Evolution of Japan’s Policy toward Economic Integration.” RIETI 
Discussion Paper Series 02-E-006, December 2001,  
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/02e006.pdf (accessed  06 February 2006 Pempel, T.J., and Shujiro 
Urata. “Japan: a New Move toward Bilateral Trade Agreements.” In Bilateral Trade Agreements in the 
Asia Pacific: Origin, Evolution, and Implication, edited by Vinod K. Aggrawal and Shujiro Urata. New 
York: Routledge, 2006.  
14
 See for example, Pekkanen, Saadia M. “Bilateralism, Multilateralism, or Regionalism? Japan’s Trade 
Forum Choices.” Journal of East Asian Studies 5, No. 1 (2005): 77-103; Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. “Keidanren 
and Free Trade Agreements, Societal Interests and Trade Policy.” Asian Survey 45, Issue 2 (2005): 258-
278; Manger, Mark. “Competition and Bilateralism in Trade Policy: the Case of Japan’s Free Trade 
Agreements.” Review of International Political Economy 12, No. 5 (2005): 804-828. 
15
 See for example, Ravenhill, John. “Japan’s Policies Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Continuities 
Amidst Change?” UBC Year of Japan: 2002-2003, Center for Japanese Research, University of British 
Columbia, 27-28 March 2002, 17. 
16
 Ravenhill, 2002, 17, for the general explanation of the nature of Japan’s economic policy see Calder, 
Kent E. “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State”, World Politics 40, 
No. 4 (1988): 517-541. 
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Therefore, by incorporating an extension of the conventional explanation this thesis 
attempts to address these issues. 
 Bearing in mind the shortcomings of previous research works, this thesis will look 
at the issue policy from a different angle examining normative changes in Japan’s trade 
policy combining external and internal forces such as changes in the international 
environment, and domestic politics, which affected normative transformation. In this 
thesis, I look at case studies of Japan’s first FTA initiatives with Mexico, South Korea 
and Singapore, which were negotiated or concluded for different strategic purposes. This 
makes the analysis of the origins, development and nature of Japan’s FTA policy 
comprehensive and allows tracing the progress of normative changes in order to illustrate 
the main argument of the thesis. In this way, the thesis aims to contribute to existing 
studies on Japan’s trade policy by providing new insights on the issue.  
 
1.4. Thesis structure 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing theories of international political economy and 
how they explain emergence of FTAs. Also, it provides a brief analysis of the 
constructivist approach in international political economy and the importance of the 
norms for explaining Japan’s FTA policy development. Furthermore, it explains that the 
impact of norms on the policy choice is often conditioned by domestic political factors.17 
In this respect, the theory of the reactive state, which deals with Japan’s domestic policy-
making and its impact on the nature of the foreign economic policy, is appropriately 
                                                 
17
 Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis Jr. ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: 
A Research Agenda.” The International Studies Review 2, No. 1 (2000): 86. 
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applied together with the constructivist approach in this thesis. Chapter 2 also provides 
the analytical framework for the case studies dealt with in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 3 gives a historical background of Japan’s foreign economic policy prior 
to 1998 and an analytical perspective of the developments in the international 
environment that led Japan to rethink its negative approach towards FTAs. Chapter 3 also 
investigates the structure of domestic politics in Japan in order to give an understanding 
of the internal causes for the increased support in domestic politics for the norm of 
bilateral trade liberalization. 
Chapter 4 deals with case studies of Japan’s FTAs with Singapore, Mexico and 
South Korea. This chapter explores the diverse reasons that impacted Japan’s policy 
makers’ decision to pursue partnership agreements with the said countries. Also, the 
effect of each agreement on the normative change will be highlighted.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the case studies to support the thesis 
hypothesis. It also identifies several key areas for future research.  
The research is conducted by reviewing existing literature on the subject including 
published books, articles, news items and official documents such as White Papers of the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”)/Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (“METI”)18 and Blue Books of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“MOFA”) and 
official statements issued by various senior policy-makers. In addition, for the purpose of 
empirical analysis, results of personal interviews with Japanese senior government 
officials are used. 
                                                 
18
 In 2001 the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was reorganized as the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
 9 
Chapter 2. Theoretical background and framework for 
analysis of Japan’s FTA policy 
2.1. Theoretical approaches to FTA policy development  
Since the early 1990s, the world has experienced a swift growth in FTAs between 
states at both bilateral and regional levels. Today, in every region of the world, countries 
negotiate FTAs both within the same region and beyond, in order to achieve their own 
objectives according to their political and economic strategies. Some view these 
agreements as security arrangements;19 as strategic interactions among countries;20 or as a 
means to access larger markets and expand economies of scale for multinational 
corporations.21 All these factors may contribute towards a state’s decision to pursue trade 
arrangements. However, sometimes, the underlying rationale may differ, depending on 
the country, such as its particular needs, domestic political situation, trading partners, and 
the region in which it is situated. 
In international political economy, there are several schools of thought that 
propose various explanations for recent proliferation of FTAs and regional integration 
trends in East Asia including Japan.  In order to understand why FTAs emerged as a tool 
in Japan’s foreign economic policy, it is important to consider the main theoretical 
                                                 
19
 See for example, Gowa, Joanne. Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1994; Duffield, John S. “International Institutions and Interstate Trade: Reassessing the 
Effects of Alliances and Preferential Trading Arrangements.” International Politics 39, No. 3 (2002): 271-
291. 
20
 See for example, Oye, Kenneth A. Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political 
Economy in the 1930s and 1980s. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992; Perroni, Carlo, and 
Whalley, John. “How Severe is Global Retaliation Risk under Increasing Regionalism?” American 
Economic Review 86, No. 2 (1996): 57-61; de Melo Jaime, and Arvind Panagariya, eds. New Dimension of 
Regional Integration.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
21
 See for example, Mansfield, Edward D., and Helen V Milner. “The New Wave of Regionalism.” 
International Organizations 53, No. 3 (1999): 589-627. 
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approaches to the issue and their respective shortcomings. Furthermore, with respect to 
the analysis of the nature of changes in Japan’s trade policy, a short overview of 
theoretical approaches to Japan’s behavior in international economic relations will be 
presented.   
  
2.1.1. Neorealism   
 According to the explanation of FTA policy development based on the neorealism 
hypothesis, international structure,22 which is anarchic, is the main variable that may 
explain the proliferation of regional cooperation initiatives and FTAs by states.23 The 
theory assumes that states are rational actors and could reach their particular goals based 
on their existing abilities. For example, a state, which possesses unchallenged 
“comprehensive power” (hegemon), can provide a precondition for other states to 
conclude agreements by creating and maintaining free trade regime and persuading other 
nations to contribute to its functioning.24 That means that participation of a hegemon in 
free trade regime provides motivation for other states to support the regime. One of the 
main hypotheses of the theory is that economic cooperation cannot exist without power 
relationships, thus, the regional economic or trade cooperation will largely be limited to 
security allies.25 However, this theory has certain limitations. It heavily relies on the 
international structure for the explanation of FTA proliferation, thus, undermining other 
                                                 
22
 International structure is the external environment in which a state and its people are enmeshed and 
interact. (Hook et al, 2001,39).  
23
 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Boston: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979. 
24
 Oyane, Satoshi. “The International Political Economy of FTA Proliferation: Testing the Analytical Scope 
of Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism.” In Whither Free Trade Agreements? Proliferation, 
Evaluation and Multilateralization, edited by Jiro Okimoto. Chiba: IDE JETRO, 2003, 96. 
25
 Gowa, 1994. 
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factors such as domestic politics. Furthermore, it ignores the diversity of purposes which 
different states target in establishing FTAs.26 
 
2.1.2. Domestic policy approach 
According to this theory, policy development towards FTAs is not simply defined 
by the state’s position in international relations and structures, but also by domestic 
actors, such as policy-making agents and social interest groups. The domestic political 
structure provides the latter with access to foreign policy making and filters the impact of 
international environment on domestic politics.27 This scenario looks at foreign economic 
policy as an outcome of domestic competition among different policy-makers reflecting 
the varied interests and preferences in play. 28  For example, some studies stress 
politicians’ preferences and interests and explain that their desire to retain office is likely 
to be an important motivating factor behind their decision-making.29 However, in the case 
of Japan, as will be elaborated in the following chapters, bureaucrats, not politicians, 
developed an idea to pursue FTAs. Hence, this theory is not sufficient for explanation of 
Japan’s FTA policy development. 
Grossman and Helpman, however, argue that domestic interest groups determine 
a state’s FTA policy and exercise pressure to promote FTA formation.30 Indeed, in the 
                                                 
26
 Oyane, 2003, 96. 
27
 Pempel T.J. Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism.  Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1982, 203. 
28
 Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson. “Japan’s International 
Relations. Politics, Economy and Security.” London and New York: Routledge, 2001. 
29
 See for example, Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political 
Change.” International Organization 49, No. 4 (1995): 627-655; Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics:  The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42, No. 3 (1988): 427-
460. 
30
 Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. “The Politics of Free Trade Agreements.” The American 
Economic Review 85, No. 4 (1995): 667-690. 
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case of the Japan-Mexico FTA (“JMFTA”), Japanese business interest group 
“Keidanren” promoted and supported the deal with Mexico, as it had significant concerns 
about the disadvantageous treatment of Japanese businesses in Mexico. Nevertheless, the 
Keidanren’s promotion of JMFTA was more of a response to the Mexico’s FTA 
initiative.  Thus, these events are mere afterthoughts and cannot justify the original 
reasons for FTAs nor explain the origin of certain preferences and interests of domestic 
actors in favor of FTAs.  
 
2.1.3. Liberalism’s Perspective 
According to this theory, economic activity, such as investments and trade 
networks, is the main determinant which fosters regional integration processes including 
FTAs. Those who favor this theory stress the importance of economic interdependence 
among states as a result of increasing flows of trade, investments, high technologies and 
human resources 31 as well as growing flows of immigration, cross-border pollutions and 
other problems.32 According to these proponents, all these factors create incentives for 
regional economic cooperation, which also includes formation of FTAs, to deal with 
problems of deepening interdependence. However, this explanation can underestimate 
political conditions for the proliferation of FTAs, such as the nature of relationships 
between countries, which might include political conflicts or tensions,33 as it was in the 
case of the agreement between Japan and South Korea.  
                                                 
31
 Oyane, 2003. 
32
 Pempel, T.J. “Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness.” In Remapping East Asia: The 
Construction of a Region, edited by T.J. Pempel. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
33
 Oyane, 2003, 105. 
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 One of the explanations behind the proliferation of FTAs from the liberalism 
perspective stresses the importance of crisis as a powerful stimulus for regional 
cooperation.34 The Asian Financial Crisis (“Crisis”) is cited by many researchers as a 
major incentive for deepening economic integration in Asia.35  In the case of Japan, the 
Crisis strengthened Japanese government’s commitments to regional financial 
cooperation which eased opposition of Asian countries to Japan’s leadership. 36 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to find direct causal links between the Crisis and the 
establishment of bilateral trade agreements. Moreover, Japanese government started to 
negotiate one of its FTAs with Mexico, a country which is geographically distant from 
South East Asia, and which was not affected by the Crisis.   
In sum, the foregoing theories do not provide comprehensive explanations 
concerning the underlying reasons for the emergence and development of FTA policy in 
Japan. The following paragraphs of this chapter consider the notions of constructivism 
approach as appropriate for this explanation, though not many studies have been 
conducted applying this approach in Japan’s context. 
 
2.1.4. Constructivism approach 
Different from the previously discussed theories, constructivism emphasizes the 
importance of ideas, norms and identities in directing regional agreements. The main 
notion of the approach is that the international structure and state actors are 
                                                 
34
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interdependent and mutually constructed, 37 unlike the neorealist and neoliberalist 
approaches assume. The structure could change through social interactions among 
agents. 38  According to this theory, agents are “socialized into specific sets of 
expectations, norms and identities” which give an understanding of their interests and 
constraints. 39 Also it provides opportunities for them to define their actions within an 
international structure.40  Furthermore, when a situation is uncertain or an outcome of a 
required choice is unpredictable ideas themselves become predictors of the policy 
direction and have impact on agents’ policy choice.41 For example, as will be explained 
in Chapter 4, by the end of the 1990s, the concept of FTA was merely an idea among a 
few bureaucrats from the Japanese MITI as a possible alternative to multilateral trade 
liberalization. Initially, FTA policy was not supported by the majority of bureaucrats 
from MOFA and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“MAFF”) and the 
outcome of this new trade policy remained uncertain. Nevertheless, MITI proceeded with 
the realization of the FTA idea into practice, overcoming opposition from MOFA and 
MAFF.  
Further, the approach can contribute to the analysis of the reasons behind the 
proliferation of FTAs in the following way. First, constructivism emphasizes the power 
of ideas stating that they can alter the nature of cooperation between states by shifting the 
interests and preference orders of domestic actors. The difference between ideas and 
norms, according to Golstein is that ideas can be held privately, and may and may not 
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have behavioral implications, while norms are always collective and behavioral. 42  
Bhagwati’s study on regionalism and FTAs in 1980 shows that the US-Canada FTA and 
further progress in EU integration, such as the Single European Act of 1985, resulted in 
the diffusion of the idea that regionalism became a world order to which other countries 
should respond. It brought about the emergence of many regional and sub-regional 
agreements at that time, including Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”).43 For 
the recent phenomenon of FTA policy origins in Japan, this approach also can be applied. 
The proliferation of FTAs around the globe eventually brought about changes in the 
international order44 and countries, following the world trend, started to pursue regional 
and bilateral trade liberalization along with multilateral liberalization within the WTO 
framework.  In Japan, the experience of EU and NAFTA stimulated the spread of ideas 
about the possible benefits of FTAs among Japanese bureaucrats. Eventually, this 
resulted in normative changes in Japan’s trade policy from multilateralism to the 
multilayered approach, which includes both multilateral and bilateral trade liberalization 
under FTAs.   
The second implication of constructivism for FTA policy development in Japan is 
in the analysis of norms which are the basis of a particular policy.45  As was briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter, norms are “the standards of behavior defined in terms 
of rights and obligations.”46  Norms are important for the study of foreign economic 
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policy as they can: (i) affect the behavior of the state through the actions of domestic 
policy actors and (ii) influence policy choice.47 
 For more than four decades the norm of multilateralism has defined Japan’s trade 
policy through its participation in GATT and its successor WTO. Japan committed itself 
to strict observance of the Article 1 of GATT which is based on the non-discriminative 
MFN principle. Although GATT represents the principle of nondiscrimination in 
international trade, Article 24 of GATT permits the formation of bilateral or regional free 
trade agreements and stipulates that the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles  6,7,8,14,15 and 20) 
are eliminated on substantially all the trade issues in a free trade area. Since 1999, Japan, 
reconsidered its strict adherence to WTO-based multilateralism by adopting the new 
norm of bilateral trade liberalization based on Article 24 48  and launched FTA 
negotiations with Singapore, Mexico and South Korea among others. Thus, the added 
principle of discriminative trade liberalization under FTAs became the new normative 
basis for Japan’s trade policy.49 
Furthermore, one should look at the sources of norms, and under what conditions 
they i) were adopted and ii) changed the state’s policy.50  Although a few theoretical 
works have been done on the norm-building process, according to Galstein, and Kovert 
and Legro, two main elements are considered to be important for norm building: norm 
entrepreneurs (policy-making actors) and the international environment which actors 
                                                 
47
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interact with.51 The interaction between actors and their environment results in creating 
and changing political norms.52  Without domestic actors who are favoring the emergence 
and acceptance of the new norm, the latter is unlikely to appear and proliferate 
domestically. 53  For this reason, it is necessary to understand the domestic political 
structure and the relationships among various political actors in the process of norm 
implementation, because they condition the acceptance of new norms.54 For example, as 
the analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 shows, the competitive relationship between MITI, 
MOFA and MAFF, and their different views on trade policy, as a result of different 
functions in the government, are the determinants of trade-policy making in Japan. It 
resulted in the relatively slow implementation of the norm of discriminative FTAs into 
domestic politics and thus, the reactive nature of Japan’s trade policy. Thus, when the 
analysis concerns the question of the origins of norms, the full separation of the material 
factors, such as the international environment and domestic actors, on the one hand, and 
ideas and norms, on the other, seem to be unlikely. 
Furthermore, Olson argues that the dramatic “shock” in the environment loosens 
commitments to existing behavioral norms and results in normative changes. The “shock” 
reveals that the politics should or must be conducted in a different way 55 His argument 
was developed further by Berger, who states that normative change is likely to develop 
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under external shock and under great strain.56  According to Ikenberry, a major security 
or economic crisis can lead to norms changing by questioning “existing rules of the 
game”.57 This argument can be supported by examples of the origins of FTA policy in 
Thailand. The failure to launch the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 can be considered as 
an external shock or crisis for Thailand which prompted the Thai government to seek 
bilateral FTAs as an alternative to multilateral liberalization.58 Kobsak Chitikul, former 
Director-General of the Department of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, stated that “..after the collapse of the Seattle meeting in December, bilateral free 
trade agreements seem to be a more likely choice for countries to achieve wider access in 
the international market.”59 In the case of Japan, the similar situation was observed, as 
will be explained in Chapter 4. The slowdown of WTO negotiations in the 1990s and the 
failure of WTO talks in Seattle in 1999 can also be regarded as an external shock that led 
Japanese government to realize the importance of bilateral and regional trade 
liberalization.  
However, a limitation of the constructivism approach is that an explanation of the 
origins and development of the FTA policy does not explain why FTAs over other ideas 
appeared to infuse countries.60  
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2.2. The nature of changes in Japan’s foreign economic policy. 
To answer the questions about the nature of Japan’s FTA policy I applied some 
concepts of the “reactive state” model, developed by Kent Cadler in 1988, 61 which gives 
characteristics of Japan’s economic policy looking at the structure of domestic politics.  It 
was labeled as probably, the most elaborated and theoretically refined view on Japan’s 
foreign economic policy.62 This model is appropriate for the analysis of Japan’s trade 
policy change towards FTAs as the latter was a reaction to FTA initiatives of other 
countries, such as Singapore, Mexico and Korea, and Japan acted as a passive follower at 
the initial stage of the policy shift.  
According to the “reactive state” model, Cadler regards Japan as passive, risk-
avoiding, and ineffective in conducting its foreign economic policy, which just “responds 
to outside pressure for changes”.63 He contends that domestic constraints in the form of a 
fragmented decision making authority and the absence of strong leadership at the top do 
not allow Japan to take bold and independent initiatives in foreign economic policy, even 
though Japan “has power and national incentives to do so.”64 
Hook supports Calder’s view that the pluralistic nature of Japan’s foreign 
economic policy-making makes it immobile and reactive.65  This is because different 
agencies, such as MOFA, MITI, MAFF and Ministry of Finance (“MOF”), conflict with 
each other because of different positions on the same matter. For example, in the case of 
Japan’s FTA policy, in the end of the 1990s, senior MITI’s bureaucrats were positive 
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about FTA initiatives, while a majority of MOFA bureaucrats resisted the idea fearing 
that FTA would undermine APEC entity and WTO principles.66 In addition, MAFF was 
also negative about any FTA opposing agricultural trade liberalization.  
However, Hook does not see the fragmented policy making as the only reason for 
immobility. The compatibility of international and domestic norms is also crucial in 
decision making as it can restrict actions of domestic actors.67 Because of the existing 
domestically embedded principles and rules, the implementation of the new norms might 
be more complicated and the scope of the new policy might be narrowed down. 
Moreover, norms influence the means that states can use to achieve their policy goals.68 
However, though a state might know about a wide range of policy instruments, it might 
reject some of them as inappropriate because of normative constraints.69 In the case of 
Japan, in the 1990s, it was aware of the fact that many countries in Europe and the 
Americas used bilateral and regional FTAs as an effective tool in their trade policy. 
Nevertheless, it did not take any action to promote bilateral or regional trade agreements, 
because policy makers were adherent only to the principle of multilateral trade 
liberalization and did not seriously consider FTAs as a policy option.70 As will be argued 
further, this was one of the reasons for Japan’s slow response to changing international 
environment and its reactive policy stance towards FTAs. 
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2.3. Framework for analysis and structure of the case studies of Japan’s FTAs 
The case studies will reveal the role of Japan’s first FTAs in the normative change 
in Japan’s trade policy from multilateralism to multilayered approach. Furthermore, they 
will demonstrate how the new norm of bilateral trade liberalization emerged and 
developed resulting in the shift in Japan’s trade policy. In the case studies I will apply a 
process-tracing approach to show how different FTA initiatives influenced the progress 
of normative changes in favor of bilateral trade agreements. I will analyze the reasons 
behind and the manner in which Japan’s attitude towards FTAs was altered in terms of 
the way the new norm was adopted through a series of negotiations and studies. I will 
look at the background of the first three FTA negotiations with Singapore, Mexico and 
South Korea as they brought about changes in domestic actors’ perceptions about FTAs.   
For the detailed analysis of the normative changes in Japan’s trade policy I will 
adopt some notions of the approach toward the norm adaptation, developed by Amitav 
Acharya71, which can be applicable in the case of Japan’s FTA policy development. He 
developed this approach for the process of norm localization, which is similar to norm 
adaptation and defined as a long-term and evolutionary assimilation of foreign ideas. For 
the purpose of this research, I will not make a distinction between these two terms and 
apply some explanations of this approach in my case studies. The process of FTA norm 
development or adaptation to existing trade practice can be divided into several stages.  
The first stage is the emergence of the new norm, which was characterized by the 
process of contestation over it.  Domestic actors can be resistant to the new norm because 
of doubts about its applicability and concerns that it might undermine existing principles 
and practices. However, some domestic actors begin to consider the new norm as 
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potentially contributing to the efficiency of existing rules and practice without there 
considerable rejection. This was the case in Japan’s trade policy, when in 1998 only a 
few bureaucrats from METI/MITI started considering possible policy shift towards 
FTAs, while other domestic actors like MOFA and MAFF were lukewarm to this idea. 
Furthermore, this section will address the reasons why bureaucrats from METI/MITI 
started thinking about FTAs and the factors that led them to consider this course of 
action. 
The second stage is the norm adaptation. In this stage, domestic policy actors try 
to adjust the new norm to the existing principles and practices and try to determine a 
common ground between them. Taking into account that norms do not emerge in a 
vacuum, but they must replace or complement existing normative practice, new norms 
are likely to compete with other norms in state domestic politics.72 In this respect, this 
section will show the way in which the new norm became embedded into the domestic 
policy and the impact of the process on the nature of Japan’s foreign economic policy. 
Furthermore, this section will look at Japan’s first FTA with Singapore and the strategy 
Japanese pro-FTA bureaucrats employed in this agreement to solve the problems during 
the establishment of the FTA policy. 
The third stage is the amplification or deepening of the new norm into trade 
policy practice. In this stage, new policy means and practice are developed based on the 
new normative basis. In the case of Japan, this stage is distinguished by further 
development of FTA initiatives, for example, with Mexico and South Korea. This part 
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will deal with the rationale behind these two FTAs and their importance for further 
development of Japan’s trade policy. 
 
In conclusion, the chapter has provided an overview of the theoretical framework 
which will be used to analyze the origins, development and the nature of Japan’s trade 
policy towards FTAs. The analysis of case studies will provide deep insights into the 
processes of Japan’s first FTA negotiations with respect of motivations for and 
characteristic of the trade policy shift. Before delving into the discussion about the actual 
FTA cases, it is important to look back at the developments of Japan’s trade policy and 
the reasons why WTO norms of multilateral trade liberalization became so deeply rooted 
in Japan. In addition, the following chapter will investigate the main characteristics of 
Japan’s domestic actors in order to understand their perceptions about trade policy, which 
determine their response to the changes in the international environment at the end of the 
1990s. 
 24 
Chapter 3. The development of Japan’s trade policy 
from multilateral to multi-layered approach 
During the last decade Japan’s foreign economic policy has undergone drastic 
changes. The government that was skeptical about any form of bilateral or regional 
trading arrangements has now taken an active interest in pursuing them and declared its 
adherence to the norm of bilateral and regional trade liberalization.1 In this respect, it is 
necessary to identify the main elements which determined and stimulated normative shift 
in Japan’s trade policy, namely (i) changes in the international environment and (ii) 
domestic policy actors. 
This chapter outlines the following issues. First, it examines the development of 
Japan’s trade policy over the period of four decades from the 1950s until the end of the 
1990s in order to provide a better understanding of traditional foreign trade principles and 
practices in Japan. Second, this chapter outlines the key changes in the world trade order, 
which created demand for a new trade policy framework in Japan in the end of the 1990s. 
Third, it identifies main characteristics of Japanese foreign economic policy-making, the 
key policy actors involved in the FTA negotiations process and their preferences and 
interests, which were formed during these four decades.  
 
3.1. Japan’s foreign economic policy prior to 1998: primacy of multilateralism 
Since 1955, when Japan became a member of GATT, until the end of 1999, 
multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT framework were at the very core of 
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Japanese trade policy. The reasons for this can be explained by the historical analysis of 
Japan’s position in the world after its defeat in World War II.  
 
3.1.1. Development of WTO centered trade policy in Japan 
The pillar of Japan’s trade policy system from the 1950s until the late 1960s was 
the promotion and expansion of its exports in order to achieve economic growth. Hence, 
obtaining broader access to foreign markets was on the agenda in Japan’s trade policy. 
Damaged by the war, the Japanese economy could not sustain itself because of a shortage 
of raw materials and food. Thus, Japan needed to maintain good trade relationships with 
other countries by participating in the world trade system through GATT. The US 
sponsored Japan to obtain the membership in GATT as a part of their overall policy 
towards Japan that was meant to promote Japan’s reconstruction and development.2 
Furthermore, in the mid-1950s, the Japanese government started the program aimed to 
modernize and rationalize the steel industry, to create a petrochemical industry, to 
promote the heavy machinery and automobile industries, to expand the electronics and 
synthetic rubber industries, and to revive the airplane industry.3 In order to protect these 
developing industries, the Japanese government imposed protective measures like import 
quotas and tariffs.4 However, by the 1960s, the competitiveness of Japanese industries 
grew to levels comparable to those in advanced countries. This allowed Japan to shift 
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from its protectionist policy towards a more liberal policy of mutual tariff lowering in 
order to get access to foreign markets.5 
Overcoming difficulties in getting admission to GATT, including opposition from 
existing members, especially from the British Commonwealth, Japan joined the 
agreement in 1955 on the discriminative conditions invoking Article 35.6 This article 
allows a contracting party to refuse extension of the Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) 
treatment to another member. 7  This was, in fact, a denial of the non-discriminative 
conditions of GATT. This attitude towards Japan from GATT member countries was 
based on the memories of the rapid expansion of Japanese exports of textile, sundries and 
other labor-intensive goods in the 1930s and the fear that it might happen again.8  
In order to persuade European countries not to invoke discriminative measures 
towards Japan the Japanese government had to consider trade liberalization measures.9 In 
this way, the government implemented the "Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization 
Program" in 1960 and created a framework for promoting liberalization of imports by 
reforming its tariff system.10 From 1960 to 1968, tariff quotas were gradually lifted and 
tariffs on industrial goods were reduced.11 To illustrate further, from 1960 to 1965, the 
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liberalization rate 12 (the measurement designed by Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) of Japan improved from 41% to 93%. 13  
Mainly, Japanese government liberalized raw materials, consumer goods, and light 
manufactures. As for tariff reduction, the average tariffs for all imports were about 18 % 
for 1961, compared to 20% for 1951. 14  Eventually, during the Kennedy Round of 
GATT15 from 1964 to 1967, Japanese government came under pressure from developed 
countries to reduce tariffs further and as a result took measures to liberalize its import 
restriction applied earlier for domestic industries protection.16  For example, after the 
implementation of the Kennedy Round tariff reduction, Japan’s average tariff on non-
agricultural products (10.7%) was on the same level with the US (9.9%) and the UK 
(10.8%).17  As a result, Japan benefited from the trade liberalization measures as it was 
critical for Japan that its new competitive products and traditional services got access to 
the larger international markets and thus, were traded as freely as possible. Gradually 
opening under GATT rules, Japanese economy benefited in terms of export growth as 
well as GDP growth (see Table 1 and 2). 
Moreover, during the 1960s and beyond, along with the development of Japanese 
industries and economic growth, the perception of free trade among Japanese bureaucrats 
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also began to change.18 For example, MOFA’s Blue Book of 1971, the year before the 
GATT Tokyo round started, pointed out that “for the world economy to achieve a greater 
expansion, Japan must, of course, promote its liberalization of trade and capital and also 
try to maintain a balance in the external aspects of its economy to help stabilize the 
international economy if it is to fulfill its responsibility commensurate with the scale of 
its economy and positively contribute to the stable expansion of world trade and the 
formation of an international economic order”.19 
Thus, Japanese government showed its strong commitments to the multilateral 
trade liberalization under the regime of the GATT. As a result, together with the US 
government, it played an active role during the GATT Tokyo round in 1975 offering 
tariff reduction on the largest number of goods as a measure to promote a multilateral 
approach towards trading relationships among nations.20 Furthermore, Japan’s behavior 
as a strong supporter of GATT at that time can be explained by the worldwide recessions, 
which caused many developed countries to implement import restriction measures. It was 
against the interests of the nation which was highly dependant on foreign trade. However, 
in spite of the fact that Japanese government recognized the benefits of multilateral trade 
liberalization, it was always very sensitive to any concessions in the agricultural sector21 
and until the present time this area remains highly protected.   
In 1995, the provisional GATT was replaced with the WTO. Naturally, in the 
same year Japan, as a main supporter and beneficiary of the multilateral trade 
liberalization framework, joined WTO. Japan expected to use the substantive and 
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procedural WTO rules, which included improved dispute settlement mechanisms, in 
dealing with its trade partners on a transparent and fair basis. As was mentioned earlier in 
this section, this multilateral approach to trade liberalization had benefited Japan for four 
decades, and so it was willing to continue this practice further not seeking any bilateral or 
regional arrangements. 
 
3.1.2. Growing economic interdependence between Japan and East Asian countries  
 Another significant factor, which determined Japan’s choice not to participate in 
any regional and bilateral trade agreements, is that Japanese government did not feel a 
need for them.  Munakata argues that “for many years Japan and the Asia-Pacific region 
enjoyed higher economic growth rates than other areas and thus, did not feel any need to 
secure markets through discriminatory economic integration agreements.” 22  Table 3 
shows that the general trend of the trade between Japan and East Asian countries has 
been upward especially in the 1970s, the 1980s  and the first part of the 1990s, peaking in 
1996, which accounted for 39.1% of Japan’s total trade. Japan’s export to Asian countries 
had been increasing rapidly and had reached 42% of Japan’s total export exceeding that 
even with the US, which was Japan’s main trade partner. Furthermore, a significant part 
of intra-East Asian industry trade from 1980 to 1999 was among Japan and East Asian 
economies (see Table 4).23 Hence, East Asian countries became important markets for 
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Japanese exports as well as key regional partners for Japan.24  This kind of regional 
economic integration was called “market driven” integration. 25  As Tanaka Hitoshi, 
former director general of Economic Affairs Bureau of MOFA, once stated, “Japan could 
have adopted a policy of promoting bilateral or regional economic integration by 
concluding FTAs with others. The reason it did not follow this course is obvious: it did 
not find the economic benefits or political necessity of doing so to be sufficient.”26  
 
3.1.3. Formation of APEC as a regional initiative to support GATT principles 
 In the mid-1980s, the situation in world trade started to change. A tendency 
toward protectionist actions outside the framework of GATT and toward regionalism 
grew in Europe, in the form of the Single European Act of 1985, which was aimed at 
having a Single European Market by 1992, and North America, such as the US-Canada 
FTA in 1987. In addition, GATT was not able to deal with the rising trade of high-tech 
products and services.27 Thus, on the one hand, as a nation which was highly dependant 
on foreign markets, Japan had a need to develop rules on those new issues and strengthen 
the disciplines of GATT. But on the other hand, being a witness of regional initiatives in 
Europe and North America as well as difficulties with GATT, Japanese government 
started to look for new possibilities of economic cooperation in the Asian region.28  
 Japan’s will to pursue non-discriminative trade liberalization and to balance 
newly emerged regional groups in Europe and North America was partly a reason for the 
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creation of APEC in 1989. The emphasis of the organization was on non-discriminatory 
liberalization among all Asia-Pacific countries including the US, 29 based on the principle 
of “open regionalism”, which means that any internal arrangement is extended to 
nonmember countries. 30  According to Funabashi, “Japan’s interests in APEC are 
multifold: to promote globalism in and from the region, to contain US unilateralism and 
prevent Europe and the Western Hemisphere from becoming protectionist, to strengthen 
ties with and to elevate Japan’s status from a regional political power by strengthening its 
ties with Asia Pacific.”31 Moreover, it was not in Japan’s interests for the world to be split 
into a few economic zones 32 for the following reasons. First, the Japanese economy 
benefited a lot from the global trade system since the creation of GATT, as was discussed 
earlier, and Japan’s trade structure was truly global33 (see Table 3): in 1990, 28.8% of 
Japan’s trade was with East Asia, 27.4% was with the US and 17% with Europe.  Second, 
Japanese government did not want to repeat the situation with bloc economies and 
protectionist measures in the biggest countries-dominions like the US, British 
Commonwealth and France in the 1920s and 1930s. Hence, Japan wanted to reduce any 
perceptions that Asia could pose a threat as a trading bloc. 34  Thus, APEC, as an 
organization meant to promote both regionalism and globalism,35  appeared to match 
Japan’s interest at that time. 
                                                 
29
 Funabashi, Yoichi. Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s role in APEC. Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1995. 
30
 Open regionalism is regional economic integration that is not discriminatory against outside countries; 
typically, a group of countries that agrees to reduce trade barriers on a most favored nation basis 
(University of Michigan, International Economics Glossary.  
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/o.html (accessed 18 January 2006)). 
31
 Funabashi, 1995, 195-196. 
32
 Terada, 1999, 13. 
33
 Funabashi, 1995, 196. 
34
 Funabashi, 1995, 196. 
35
 Terada, 1999, 13. 
 32 
 To sum up, up to the 1990s, Japanese foreign economic policy had been 
experiencing a few changes from the politics of high protection of domestic industries, 
through multilateral trade liberalization under GATT rules towards “open regionalism”, 
which was in line with GATT principle of non-discriminative liberalization.  During that 
time, Japan was not involved in regional trade agreements as it had been benefiting from 
the multilateral non-discriminative trade liberalization, which was based on Article 1 of 
GATT. 
 
3.2.Changes in the international environment and Japan’s domestic actors’ reaction 
to them. 
3.2.1. Failure of WTO talks and EVSL initiative 
The number of WTO/GATT members grew from 23 during the first GATT 
negotiations in 1947 to 149 by 2006. This slowed down the negotiation process within 
the WTO framework and made it more complicated as the interests of more member 
countries had to be taken into consideration. Moreover, the involvement of sensitive 
issues for many countries, such as labor and agriculture among others, into the agenda, 
became another obstacle for smooth WTO negotiation processes. Complexity of trade 
issues undermined the decision-making mechanism of the WTO based on consensus and 
resulted in the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999.36  This 
partly prompted Japanese MITI to reconsider its WTO-centered trade policy. 
To illustrate, according to Hatakeyama Noboru, ex-Vice-Minister for 
International Affairs in MITI, “the temporary breakdown in the GATT Uruguay Round, 
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which was held in 1986-1994, spurred momentum for more manageable free-trade 
agreements in the world. Thereafter, NAFTA and the ASEAN Free Trade Area were 
established.”37 However, at that time Japan was adherent only to the norm of multilateral 
trade liberalization under Article 1 of GATT. A significant reconsideration of this norm 
came after the failure of WTO talks in Seattle in December 1999. The then Vice-minister 
of International Affairs in MITI, Arai Hisamitsu, said in his interview that confidence in 
the WTO has faded. “Japan is one of the countries that benefits the most under the free-
trade system…We must work hard to maintain the WTO free trade system”.38 But in the 
following year he admitted that “if Japan were to rely only on the WTO, we will not be 
able to liberalize for the next few years until the next global round of trade talks. Japan 
will be left behind in terms of competitiveness”.39 Thus, it looked like Japanese MITI’s 
bureaucrats were deeply disappointed with the breakdown of WTO talks, as it questioned 
the effectiveness of the current principles in the trade policy, and thus, were looking for 
alternative ways to maintain this trade system.  
Indeed, in order to conclude FTAs with other countries Japan would have to 
tackle domestic issues of agriculture and labor forces, which have low competitiveness 
due to political support involved, as will be explained below.  Moreover, due to increased 
competitive pressures brought about by increased amount of import products and number 
of foreign firms on the domestic market, as a result of trade and FDI liberalization and 
facilitation under FTAs, the efficiency of local companies could be improved.40 
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Moreover, Urata claims that Japanese policy makers realized the importance of 
trade liberalization for economic revitalization through fiscal, financial and other areas 
and the difficulties in the WTO negotiation process only triggered them to view FTAs in 
a different light, as a useful tool for economic reforms.41 Also, in a personal interview, 
the Deputy Director General of Trade Policy Bureau of METI, Sasaki Nobuhiko, 
explained that the failure of WTO was one of the main factors which made policy-makers 
seriously reconsider the need to have FTAs.42   
This thesis does not claim that FTAs can alone improve competitiveness of 
Japanese industries and promote reforms in the country. However, the following should 
be taken into account. Since the early 1990s Japan has been in a long recession, mostly 
because of the inefficiency of the post-war system which contributed to Japan’s post-war 
economic growth. Taking into account inability of Japanese policy-makers to restructure 
the economic system during that decade, it seemed that there was certain inertia of past 
economic system that slowed down the progress of deregulation. 43  That is why the 
external stimulus, such as increased inflow of goods, people and money under FTAs, 
could be necessary. 44 
Along with the setback in WTO negotiations, the Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization (“EVSL”), perhaps “the most aggressive trade liberalization project in the 
history of APEC”45 which had attempted to liberalize tariff and non-tariff barriers in nine 
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sectors,46  also failed in 1998. Members, including the US and Japan, faced political 
difficulties in liberalizing sensitive areas, such as forestry and fishery products.47 This 
failure of EVSL demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the APEC mechanism in trade 
liberalization.48 According to Kajita, at that time, Japanese officials thought if EVSL 
failed Japan would be blamed for its failure. So they started thinking about and 
discussing another approach, such as FTAs, to economic integration in the region.49 
 
3.2.2. Global proliferation of FTAs 
As explained above, since the late 1980s the international environment has 
undergone changes in trading between nations. Developed countries such as the US and 
European countries began to shift towards greater reliance on regional and bilateral trade 
arrangements, stepping out from the non-restrictive and non-discriminatory trading 
principles previously adopted by them under the GATT regime.  
In 1994, the US, Canada and Mexico created NAFTA. After that time, nearly 140 
FTAs were established, and by October 2002, among the top economies in the world only 
Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong were not members of any FTA.50 
Thus, if it did not follow suit, Japan faced the risk of being isolated in a new world trade 
order in which nations sought to benefit from bilateral and regional trading 
arrangements.51 In an interview, the then Minister of International Trade and Industry, 
Takeo Hiranuma, stated that only Japan and a few other countries in Asia were outside 
                                                 
46
 Krauss, 2003, 317. 
47
 Krauss, 2003, 318. 
48
 Munakata, 2001, 12. 
49
 Interview with  Kajita Takehito, Staff reporter World Service Section, International Department, Kyodo 
News; Senior Research Fellow, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, 07 February 2006. 
50
 Hatakeyama, Noboru. “Short History of Japan’s Movement to FTAs.” Journal of Japanese Trade & 
Industry, January/February, 2002, http:// www.jef.or.jp (accessed 16 February). 
51
 Hatakeyama, 2002. 
 36 
the world trend and it was not desirable. He admitted: “We must first take bilateral 
approaches in fields with high growth potential, such as information technology. This 
will greatly benefit global trade liberalization and economic development.”52  
In addition, the formation of NAFTA and EU strengthened economic and political 
ties among countries within these regional agreements. For example, according to METI, 
trade among the NAFTA member countries increased by 9.6% between 1985 and 1990 
and by 10.7% between 1990 and 1999, while trade with countries outside NAFTA grew 
by 11.9% and 4.7%, respectively during the same period. 53  In the case of EU, intra-
regional trade grew by 18.5% between 1985 and 1990 and 3.6% between 1990 and 1999, 
while extra-regional trade grew by 11.9% and 5.5%, for the same period.54 In 1999, MITI 
in its White Paper on International Trade for the first time acknowledged that NAFTA, 
among other pacts, stimulate regional trade and investment and contribute to global 
economic activity.55  
The global trend of forming FTAs influenced perceptions of Japanese 
bureaucrats.  Hatakeyama Noboru, who used to be a Vice Minister for International 
Affairs in METI between 1991 and 1993 and played a key role in the final stages of the 
Uruguay round of world trade liberalization under GATT, viewed a global trend of the 
growth of regional trade blocks as an important reason for Japan to revise its trade policy. 
"With or without the failure of the WTO Seattle summit, I have repeatedly said that Japan 
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must seek a bilateral free-trade pact to avoid lapsing into isolation… we should consider 
both bilateral and multilateral frameworks as parallel concepts (that can complement each 
other)." 56  Moreover, he acknowledged that he used to say that “we'd stick to that 
principle of Article 1 of GATT, open and non-discriminatory trade liberalization, even if 
Japan was invited into some free-trade arrangements.”57 However, he has eased his stance 
due to the fact that Japan’s trading partners have been forming regional trade blocks, such 
as NAFTA and the EU, while WTO talks have slowed down. "Along with China, South 
Korea and Taiwan, Japan is the only major economy left behind today.” “GATT’s Article 
24 allows free-trade agreements”, he added, “it may be wise for Japan to start with 
nonagricultural countries, given the "cautious domestic stance" on cheap agricultural 
imports”.58 
  In addition, the Minister of International Trade and Industry in 1998, Yosano 
Kaoru, concerned that other countries might think that Japan has a strong desire or plans 
to have influential areas in Asia again, similar to it ones had at the beginning of the 
Pacific War. But since most of the main trading countries, 26 out of the 30 largest, have 
joined bilateral or regional FTAs besides WTO and trading volume with countries outside 
of such areas is increasing, MITI gradually started thinking that such agreements could 
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3.2.3. Japan’s changing role in the Asian region 
In addition to the changes noted above, the economic role of Japan in East Asia 
has also undergone changes. Japan has played a significant role in the East Asian 
economic development since 1970s with its investments in the region, export of 
technology and ODA. 60  However, the situation changed in the 1990s after Japan 
experienced an economic downturn. As a result, Japan became a less important trading 
partner for developing East Asian economies. Specifically, the share of imports from 
Japan in developing East Asia's overall imports declined from 22.1% in 1990 to 16.5% in 
200161. Likewise, the share of exports to Japan in developing East Asia's overall exports 
also declined from 14.8% to 12.1% during the same period. By contrast, the 
corresponding shares of East Asia's imports from and exports to China increased from 
8.1% and 5.5% to 9.8% and 9.2%, respectively during the same period, reflecting the 
rapid expansion of China's economy and trade.62   
The above changes in the import and export patterns significantly affected Japan. 
Since the early 1980s, Japan’s overall trade with East Asian countries exceeded that with 
the US63 and Japan became dependant on Asian markets. Generally speaking, about 40% 
of Japan’s exports and imports are within Asia as compared to only 20% of its imports 
coming from the U.S. and 30% of its exports going there64 (see Table 3). Although in 
figures, Japan still remains the biggest trade partner and investor in East Asia, its share is 
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declining gradually.65 Thus, formation of FTAs with East Asian countries was seen by 
Japan as an effective way to revive Japan’s declining economic role in the region.  
 Finally, it is also important to highlight the growing economic power of China in 
the region. According to Pempel, “the economic rise of China provided multiple sources 
for capital development and economic growth across Asia. As a result, there is no longer 
a Japan-dominated hierarchy, in terms of capital and trade, but multiple overlapping 
networks.”66 Pempel states that the presence of Chinese business network and capital all 
over Asia, the greater production network in Asia, and the growing economic 
interdependence between China and East Asia, as was shown above, posed a serious 
competition and challenge to Japan.67   Moreover, China’s strong interest in regional 
integration and involvement in FTA negotiation with ASEAN had had an impact on 
Japan’s decision to actively pursue FTA with ASEAN too. As Toshiya Tsugami, a senior 
fellow at the Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry, (“RIETI”), a 
government-funded think-tank in Japan, pointed out, "the signing of free trade 
agreements between China and the ASEAN countries was a big shock…the fear of being 
left behind, or 'missing the bus,' has really accelerated the process." 68 Indeed, Japan 
proposed an FTA to ASEAN in November 2002, a day after China agreed to start FTA 
negotiations with ASEAN.69 
 To sum up, since the late 1980s world trade order has experienced few significant 
changes such as difficulties of the WTO negotiation process, increasing number of FTAs 
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around the globe, declining economic role of Japan, and growing significance of China in 
the Asian region. These events had a significant impact on bureaucrats’ perceptions of 
Japan’s role in the world and regional trade system. As a result, as explained in the 
following Chapter, Japanese bureaucrats started considering the possibility to alter the 
trade policy in favor of FTAs. 
 
3.3. Japan’s domestic actors and their normative perception of trade policy 
The analysis of motivations and reasons for policy change in Japan would be 
incomplete without examining the trade policy perceptions of policy-makers, who are 
developing new ideas and principles. This analysis is crucial for the understanding why 
and how new ideas and norms spread among government officials, bearing in mind the 
particularities of the historical and political background of the decision making 
mechanism in Japan. Thus, in this section I will identify domestic actors who developed 
the idea of FTAs and influenced the progress of FTA policy.  
Classic view on Japanese state\market system put forward by Chalmers Johnson 
is that bureaucracy has political power to create economic policy and control it.70  This 
view was disputable by some scholars arguing that bureaucrats do not really have much 
influence on the economic policy but market forces and business have significant impact 
on the policy regulation in general as well as in the case of Japan’s FTA policy.71   
However, as the case studies in the following chapter reveals, the bureaucrats, mainly 
from MITI/METI, were the main domestic actors who promoted the idea of regional and 
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bilateral agreements in the late 1990s. This can be explained by the fact they have 
expertise in a particular policy area which they provide to politicians for policy 
formulation.72 Moreover, politicians were often criticized for not taking a leadership in 
the process of FTA policy development on its initial stage.73 Thus, in the thesis I am 
considering bureaucrats as being the key domestic actors who questioned the excising 
principles of Japan’s trade policy and put forward FTA policy initiative. 
Moreover, in Japan, bureaucratic structure is fragmented due to the involvement 
of several governmental bodies in foreign economic policy formulation which require a 
lengthy process of consensus building among different ministries. In the case of FTAs 
bureaucrats from MITI and MOFA as well as MAFF, were the main policy actors who 
participated in the FTA policy making. The following is the analysis of the impact of 
such bureaucratic structure on Japan’s trade policy. 
 
3.3.1.MITI and MOFA: differences in trade policy perception 
 The brief historical overview of the involvement of MITI and MOFA in foreign 
economic policy-making will explain the process of decision-making and the ministries’ 
positions on current trade policy.  For more than four decades, MOFA and MITI were 
mostly exclusively oriented to the bilateral relationships with the US which were a pillar 
of Japanese foreign economic policy.74 Since the end of World War II the US has become 
the main recipient of Japanese goods.75 Export dependence on the American trade was 
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27% in 1960, 31% in 1970, and 24% in 1980 (see Table 3). 76  For their part they 
demanded that Japan sign a security treaty in 1960, which played a significant part in the 
Japan-US bilateral relationship in general, and trade relations in particular. For example, 
to meet its commitments to the treaty, Japan provided material support for the Korean 
and Vietnamese wars and allowed the US to maintain bases in its own territory. In 
exchange, the latter guaranteed Japan’s military security and provided access to 
American markets for its economic growth.77 The US became the main market which 
absorbed various Japanese goods over time: textiles in the 1960s, color televisions in the 
1970s, automobiles in the 1980s, and semi conductors in the 1990s.78 In this way, the 
relationships with the US became the core of the foreign economic policy and thus, 
became institutionalized in the Japanese MOFA and MITI. 79  However, the rising 
American trade deficit with Japan along with long-lasting trade disputes over 
telecommunications, electronics, pharmaceutical and other products in the 1980s made 
the trade relations between the two countries highly confrontational.80  
MITI has been a main actor in international trade disputes with the US. This can 
be explained by the fact that industries which expanded their export in the 1970s and 
1980s, such as steel, automobile or semiconductors, were under MITI’s jurisdiction.81 
Trade friction management and increasing pressure from the US to open up these 
Japanese markets became a big problem for MITI at the time.82 These trade disputes 
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covering wider spectrum of medium and high tech products,83 like semiconductors and 
electronics, became frequent and intense. To prevent possible protectionist movements 
from the US, since the beginning of 1988, MITI’s Trade Policy Bureau started studying 
options to ease the frictions.84 These options included broader cooperative agreements 
with Asia, since by that time Japan’s trade volume with Asia was increasing. Even 
though MITI always recognized the importance of the US market and their dominance in 
the world-trade system, it did not deny the possibility of extending economic 
opportunities in East Asia and other regions.85  The culmination of this approach of MITI 
to foreign economic policy was the creation of APEC, as mentioned earlier. 
The process of approval of the APEC policy among ministry officials from MITI 
and MOFA demonstrated the confrontational relationships between the two ministries, 
which afterwards affected the development and nature of Japan’s FTA policy. It is 
important to mention for further understanding of Japan’s economic policy development 
that, from the time of the creation of APEC, MITI was more open to new alternatives in 
the trade policy. The first MITI proposal to create an Asia Pacific organization came 
from MITI’s Minister Hajime Tamura in 1987. 86  Further APEC policy-making was 
affected by the bureaucratic rivalry between MOFA and MITI as both ministries wanted 
“to increase power by gaining more responsibility for international trade policy.” 87  
MOFA did not support MITI’s efforts to establish APEC, fearing that firstly, this 
cooperation which would include ASEAN countries might remind them of the experience 
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with the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere 88 ”, which would undermine the 
relationship with ASEAN countries; secondly, MOFA could not allow MITI to take a 
lead in the foreign policy shift which MOFA did not agree with.89 To illustrate, MOFA 
showed its reluctance to help MITI in its move to create APEC by refusing to send 
anyone to accompany MITI’s head, Shigero Muraoka, on his tour around ASEAN 
countries to promote APEC ideas. Furthermore, MOFA planned to ask ASEAN countries 
to decline MITI’s APEC proposals.90 Only after the appointment of Hiroshi Mitsuzuka as 
a foreign minister, who previously served as a MITI’s minister, did MOFA give its 
support to APEC in 1989.91 
 In addition, Krauss sees the difference between the two Ministries (MITI and 
MOFA) in their different mission.92 MOFA’s task is to preserve political relationships 
with countries and avoid antagonism and interests which clash with other countries 
through policy changes, especially with the US.93  Meanwhile, MITI’s function is to 
advocate Japan’s overseas trade and commercial interests, such as export promotion, 
import regulation and international trade dispute settlement among others. 
The example of the creation of APEC shows the differences in the positions on 
trade policy and the conflict over economic policy jurisdiction between the two main 
domestic policy actors in Japan – MITI and MOFA. The lack of coordination between the 
two ministries, based on their established beliefs, norms and practice, also took place 
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when MITI decided to go ahead with the idea of having FTAs with Mexico, Singapore 
and South Korea, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3.2. Agriculture and trade policy making in Japan 
Another ministry which has been influential in Japan’s FTA negotiations is the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry (MAFF). It has veto-power in agriculture-
related domains, and thus, was able to overrule the MITI-MOFA position on issues of 
trade liberalization.94 Agricultural trade was always an important area of trade dispute95 
even within the GATT/WTO trade liberalization framework.  
Strong influence of MAFF on trade issues is deeply rooted in the Japanese 
election system and dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”). This is because 
since 1955, LDP has been heavily dependant on political support provided by various 
interest groups,96 especially agricultural ones.  The reason for this is that Japan’s electoral 
system is based on electoral districting, and rural areas represent the majority of the 
districts. This made rural districts crucial for an LDP majority in the Diet. In spite of the 
fact that the population of rural electorate decreased from 41.3% of total electorate in 
1955 to 7.7% in 2003, 97 MAFF, agricultural policy specialists or “tribe” Diet members 
(“norin zoku”) and Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (“zenchu”) still exercise 
significant power of intervention in trade policy, when it comes to agricultural trade 
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liberalization. For example, in 1995 during the APEC liberalization initiative within 
Osaka Action Agenda (“OAA”), which concerned the food sector, MAFF together with 
the “norin zoku” and “zenchu” succeeded in implementing the ‘Flexibility Principle98” in 
OAA, thus hindering the process of trade liberalization.99 This principle is considered to 
be controversial as it allows import-sensitive sectors to be liberalized more slowly. 100 
In the case of FTA policy development, MAFF and agricultural interest groups, 
appealing to the need for food security, opposed any liberalization of agricultural 
imports.101 The position of MAFF was that agricultural issues were to be negotiated 
within the WTO framework after consultation with farmers. 102  The opening of the 
agricultural markets was an issue in FTA negotiations with most of the countries, like 
Mexico, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, to name a few. For example, in the 
case of Japan-Mexico FTA, the disagreements on liberalization of pork and orange juice 
import delayed the conclusion of the agreement. In the case of Japan-Korea FTA, 
agricultural issues, like dried seaweed and fishery, were holding up progress in free trade 
agreement talks between the two countries.103  The following chapter deals with this 
matter in detail. 
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3.3.3. The role of “big business” in Japanese trade policy making 
Another actor which influenced Japan’s foreign trade policy is “big business,”104 
mostly represented by the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) which 
comprises of 123 major industrial associations.105 It exercises influence through close 
financial and interpersonal networks with the LDP and links with economic ministries, 
including MITI/METI, as a result of extensive trade and investment links throughout the 
globe.106 For example, the top level of the organization Zaikai (“business world”) used to 
contribute significant financial donations to the LDP’s running costs and election 
campaign costs. 107  Although Keidanren ceased this activity in 1994, it still maintains 
close relationships with politicians through unofficial gatherings between its leaders and 
senior politicians, and exchanges of opinions between its secretariat and respective 
organs of political parties.108 The main role of Keidanren is to collect opinions from the 
business community about domestic and foreign economic issues and represent their 
business interests in the Diet, the government and the community.109 It plays a significant 
informative role for the Japanese government.110  For example, Keidanren showed its 
keen interests in bilateral and regional agreements by conducting a few studies and 
issuing position papers on the possibility of Japan’s FTAs starting from the year 1999. It 
informed the government about its business position on the FTA matter and possible 
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losses for Japanese industries as a result of postponing FTAs.111 It was most active in the 
promotion of the FTA with Mexico, as Japanese companies in Mexico were in 
disadvantageous positions compared to those from NAFTA and EU countries. During the 
early stages of the policy changes, Keidanren played mostly an informative role gathering 
opinions from its members and delivering them to the government to facilitate FTA 
policy development.112  
 
In conclusion, this Chapter covered the driving forces for the normative change in 
Japan’s trade policy – international environment and domestic policy structure. First, the 
analysis of international environment demonstrates why Japan was adhered to the norm 
of multilateral trade liberalization under GATT Article 1 for more than four decades and 
did not see any incentive to pursue discriminative bilateral trade liberalization. As long as 
the international environment started to change and countries began pursuing regional 
and bilateral trade arrangements, bureaucrats from MITI understood that Japan, as a 
nation highly dependant on international trade, can not stay away from the new world 
trend. Thus, they became more receptive to the new normative order which included 
discriminative trade agreements. Second, the analysis of domestic policy actors, due to 
their abilities to construct and promote ideas and norms,113  is another indispensable part 
of the norms’ development. Analysis of three main ministries, MITI/METI, MOFA and 
MAFF, showed that policy-making process was uncoordinated and ministries had 
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different position on the trade policy strategy. Hence, the new idea of FTA faced a highly 
confrontational domestic structure, where domestic actors had their own certain beliefs, 
perceptions and norms regarding trade policy formulation. This factor would have an 
impact on further progress of FTA idea and norm development slowing down the FTA 
implementation process. 
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Chapter 4. The case study of Japan’s FTA policy development 
4.1. Japan’s first FTA initiatives: emergence of the norm of bilateral trade 
liberalization. 
This Chapter deals with Japan’s FTA intitiatives with Mexico, South Korea and 
Singapore as they provided the foundation for normative change and its further 
development in Japan’s trade policy towards FTAs. Moreover, these first FTA initiatives 
helped Japanese bureacrats reveal the difficulties embedded in domestic politics, such as 
agricultural trade liberalization, for implementation of the norm of disctiminative trade 
agreements in Japan. Thus, when faced with these difficulties, Japanese bureacrats had to 
find appropriate mechanisms to overcome them. In addition, the analysis of the first 
FTAs provided in this Chapter reveals the reactive character of Japan’s foreign trade 
policy-making and reasons for it. That is why the study of these first FTAs is necessary to 
answer the research questions about the origins, development and nature of Japan’s FTA 
policy. The structure of the Chapter is based on the framework introduced in Chapter 2, 
which looks at the three stages of FTA policy development based on normative changes 
towards deepening the FTA principles of discriminative trade liberalization in Japan’s 
trade policy. 
 
4.1.1. FTA proposal from Mexico 
The first proposal to establish an FTA with Japan came from Mexico. Unofficial 
discussion about a possible FTA between Japan and Mexico started from an informal 
meeting in July 1998 between Herminio Blanco, Mexico’s Commerce and Industry 
Minister, and Noboru Hatakeyama, the Chairman of Japan External Trade Organization 
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(“JETRO”), during which Blanco expressed his interest in having an FTA with Japan. 
The proposal was conveyed to the MITI’s Minister Kaoru Yosano. Anticipating a 
possible big change in Japan’s trade policy he instructed the Director-General of MITI’s 
International Trade Policy Bureau to conduct a study on the feasibility of having an 
FTA.1 In October 1998, after a few months of study, the International Trade Policy 
Bureau issued a report named “Promotion of a Strategic Trade Policy: Orientation of 
Regional Economic Agreements”. It emphasized the economic and political merits of 
FTAs and proposed regional approach toward some countries including Mexico. The 
report concluded that the study, not necessary “negotiations”, on the bilateral FTA with 
Mexico could be started.2  It was one of the very first steps from Japanese bureaucrats to 
realize the idea of FTAs, even though it was not congruent with the rules of traditional 
non-discriminative trade in Japan. 
In November 1998, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo paid an official visit to 
Tokyo and raised an initiative to have an FTA with Japan at the Japan-Mexico 
Businessmen’s Joint Committee Meeting, which was held by JETRO. Meanwhile, 
Herminio Blanco expressed the idea of an FTA between Mexico and Japan to MITI’s 
Minister Kaoru Yosano. However, Yosano was not very enthusiastic about the proposal 
and offered a counterproposal of a bilateral investment treaty.3  Thus, in spite of the fact 
that the idea of the FTA with Mexico attracted attention of MITI’s bureaucrats and 
stimulated them to conduct the FTA study, they were very careful about starting official 
discussion. 
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However, unlike the Japanese bureaucrats, Japanese business circles represented 
by Keidanren seemed to be more interested in the FTA and in January 1999, Keidanren 
established a “Working group on Japan-Mexico Bilateral Treaties.”4  Hence, Keidanren’s 
concrete involvement in the FTA discussion started earlier than the government’s formal 
actions.5   
Keidanren conducted two studies and issued the following reports regarding 
JMFTA: “Report on the Possible Effects of a Japan-Mexico Free Trade Agreement on 
Japanese Industry” in April 1999 and “Challenges for the Upcoming WTO Negotiations 
and Agendas for Future Japanese Trade Policy” in May 1999”. In these reports, 
Keidanren pointed out that Japan should promote FTAs and accelerate their negotiations 
for further business activity of Japanese companies and contribute to domestic structural 
reforms.6 In addition, in February 1999, JETRO together with the Mexican Minister of 
Commerce and Industrial Development organized the Committee for Closer Economic 
Relations between Japan and Mexico. In April 2000, the Committee issued a report 
supporting the idea of the FTA, which could increase Japanese-Mexican trade by about 
30%.7 However, no actions from the government followed the report. Hence, despite the 
fact that Japanese business circles got interested in the FTA and tried to convey the 
message about it to the government, the idea did not find positive response from the 
latter.   
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In February 2000, after five months of preliminary talks, Japan and Mexico 
decided to launch full-scale negotiations on Bilateral Investment Agreement aiming to 
reach the agreement by the end of 2000. This agreement was expected to give “national 
treatment” and MFN status to Japanese companies in Mexico. 
Hence, Japanese government tried to promote other forms of economic 
cooperation, such as an investment treaty instead of an FTA, in order to meet the 
demands and satisfy interests of the Japanese business circles for closer economic 
cooperation between Japan and Mexico. This reluctant attitude towards entering into an 
FTA was clearly reflected in the interviews and statements given by several senior 
bureaucrats from MITI. For example, when in August 2000 Blanco visited Tokyo and 
called for an early start of bilateral talks, the then Ministry of Trade and Industry, Takeo 




Furthermore, on the one hand, MITI’s bureaucrats got involved in the process of 
changes of the trade policy principles developing an FTA idea. But, on the other hand, 
they were reluctant to actively pursue this idea. It can be explained by the lack of political 
will for such drastic changes in the trade policy because of the possible impact of FTAs 
on the traditional trade practice and the balance of interests within domestic political 
system. To illustrate, some key reasons can be cited for the aforesaid lukewarm attitude 
of the bureaucrats. First, Mexico was a country with a significant agricultural base and 
agriculture represented a sizable portion of Japan’s imports from Mexico (20.6% in 
2001). 9  Thus, bureaucrats from MITI anticipated strong opposition from the local 
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farmers, MAFF, “zenchu” and “norinzoku”, which would make the handling of the issue 
of agricultural trade liberalization complicated. Second, the Japanese government was 
more interested in strengthening the relationship with Asia, in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. Thus, an FTA with Mexico, which was geographically distant, 
was not a priority. For example, in 1999 and 2000, MOFA officials did not recognize the 
need for an FTA with Mexico and was arguing that Singapore and South Korea should be 
given priority.10 Moreover, during the first senior official meeting on economic affairs 
between Japan and Mexico in July 1999, participants emphasized the formation of an 
investment agreement, but not an FTA.11  
To sum up, irrespective of the reluctance of the Japanese bureaucrats mentioned 
above, it could be argued that the FTA proposal from Mexico spurred the interest of 
Japanese bureaucrats from MITI in FTAs. However, as the official FTA talks and 
statements from Japanese senior bureaucrats demonstrated, this was not sufficient to 
change the traditional trade practice in Japan. Mexico did not appear to be a strategic 
importance for Japanese policy makers at that time and liberalization of agriculture 
seemed to be a strong barrier to the implementation of discriminative trade agreements in 
the trade policy. That is why it was difficult for Japanese bureaucrats to find a common 
ground between the new idea of bilateral trade liberalization and traditional trade practice 
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4.1.2. FTA proposal from South Korea 
The second FTA proposal to Japan was made by South Korea in 1998. This FTA 
initiative played an important role in the process of normative changes and policy shift 
towards bilateral trade liberalization because of the following reasons.  First, unlike 
Mexico, which was not regarded as a potential FTA partner in the late 1990s by most of 
the bureaucrats from MITI and MOFA, South Korea was regarded as a natural FTA 
partner for Japan given its geographical proximity, OECD membership and common 
values and economic interest to revive domestic economies.12  Second, an FTA with 
South Korea might help to overcome “historical animosity between the two countries and 
forge their relations as economic allies.” 13 Thus, bearing in mind these considerations, 
South Korea was strategically important for Japan as an FTA partner and this spurred the 
consideration of Japanese bureaucrats about the possibility of an FTA.   
It appeared that Japan expressed the wish for a possible free trade agreement with 
South Korea on September 16, 1998, almost a month before President Kim Dae Jung’s 
official FTA proposal to Japan. The Japanese Ambassador to South Korea, Ogura Kazuo, 
expressed the need for an FTA between the two countries at a monthly breakfast meeting 
of the Federation of Korean Industries (“FKI”). He explained that South Korea and Japan 
must pursue their mutual objectives for their mutual economic development. 14  The 
proposition by Ogura, made it clear that Japan was keen on deepening economic and 
political relationships between countries and the FTA could become a symbol of their 
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renewed relationships.15  In his interview, Ogura admitted that he used the term free-trade 
agreement in a very broad sense meaning broad economic cooperation between the two 
nations, which would include the possibilities of an FTA or some other forms of 
economic integration.16  
Afterwards, in October 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung paid an 
official visit to Japan, the first time since March 1994, hoping to improve bilateral 
relations between the two countries. He offered an “Action Plan for a New Korea-Japan 
Partnership for the 21st Century” and proposed to resolve any problems the two countries 
had before within the 20th century.17 This visit was crucial for the renewed closer bilateral 
cooperation between Japan and South Korea as it helped them hold comprehensive trade 
and investment talks, which were difficult to conduct in the past.18  During this meeting, 
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi expressed his deep apologies for Japan’s hostile 
actions in the past towards South Korea which were included in the joint communiqué.19  
During discussions, the two leaders recognized the need to enhance relationships in 
political and economic affairs 20 and signed a tax treaty that provided equal conditions for 
Japanese and South Korean companies operating in both countries. 21 Given the 
circumstances, Kim Dae Jung’s visit paved the way for further development of economic 
and political cooperation and gave grounds for future FTA proposal. 
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The official proposal to conduct a study about an FTA came from South Korea in 
November 1998 during the Ministerial meeting held in Kagoshima. It received a positive 
response from Japanese MITI’s Minister Yosano Kaoru. Following this understanding, 
the JETRO’s Institute of Developing Economies (“IDE”) and the Korean Institute for 
Economic Policies (“KIEP”) launched a non-governmental joint study to strengthen 
economic partnership between the two countries, which included the possibility of having 
an FTA.22  At the same time, both governments agreed to begin preliminary negotiations 
on an investment agreement.  
South Korea’s proposal to have an FTA coincided with MITI’s new thinking 
about alternatives in Japanese trade policy, and this stimulated further FTA discussions 
within Japanese ministries.23 This proposal appeared to be a “turning point” in Japan’s 
perception of FTAs.24 It was unprecedented that Japan did not deny the opportunity to 
have a bilateral trade agreement with South Korea, while still being lukewarm to 
Mexico’s FTA proposal. It seemed that MITI’s bureaucrats were receptive to the idea of 
FTAs in general but were selective about the counterpart of such discriminative 
agreement. For example, in the report “Promotion of Strategic Trade Policy: Orientation 
of Regional Economic Agreement”, issued in October 1998, Director-General of the 
International Policy Bureau, Hidehiro Konno placed first priority on the FTA with South 
Korea while considering studies about possible FTAs with other countries.25  
The above facts illustrate that Japanese officials from MITI were excited about 
the opportunity to improve economic and political relations with South Korea and wanted 
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to use an FTA as a means for achieving it. However, on the other hand, the Japanese 
government was still cautious about its official statements regarding the FTA. For 
example, in March 1999, Japanese Prime-Minister Keizo Obuchi visited South Korea 
with the proposal of “Japan-Korea Economic Agenda 21” aimed to strengthen economic 
ties between the two countries. 26  He mentioned investment facilitation, tax treaty, 
cooperation in standards and intellectual property rights,27 but not directly an FTA.  
Moreover, in October 1999, during the second ministerial meeting in Cheju, 
following the one in Kagoshima, ministries of both countries reconfirmed the importance 
of prompt conclusion of the investment agreement, not the FTA.28 Furthermore, among 
Japanese government officials, there were common opinions about JKFTA that: "It is 
better to approach the matter step by step starting with individual agreements such as one 
on investment," or "The best way is to advance carefully because if we provoke political 
antipathy, we can't accomplish anything”.29 Therefore, Japan seemed to be determined to 
approach the issue cautiously.30 In addition, there was no consensus among Ministries 
regarding the FTA because of the differences in their perceptions about it. According to 
the Deputy Press Secretary of MOFA Masaki Okada the idea to establish a free trade 
agreement including Japan and South Korea was not on the official agenda between the 
two governments. They prioritized liberalization of investment activities between the two 
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countries.31 That is why during the visit of Foreign Minister Komura in 1999, Japan and 
South Korea agreed to hold a preliminary consultation on the investment treaty.  
Furthermore, MOFA regarded economic cooperation with South Korea in the 
light of revitalization of its economy after the Asian financial crisis and prevention of 
recurrences of crisis. 32  In its Report for the Mission for Revitalization of Asian 
Economies, MOFA stressed that investment agreements and mutual recognition, as well 
as the tightening of relations between companies from both countries are the tasks for the 
immediate future. The possibility of the FTA was considered as a long term 
perspective.33  Unlike MOFA, MITI’s position, as was discussed above, was to support 
the FTA, although they did not declare it in official statements. For example, as reported 
by Yosano during the meeting at Kagoshima, the FTA initiative was worth considering, 
but nothing would be announced officially.34   
To conclude, in striving to improve relationships with South Korea, the Japanese 
government used the term of FTA in its official talks with South Korea. However, the 
concept of FTA was still very new to Japan and there was no consensus among the 
Japanese ministries, MITI and MOFA, as well as political will of the Prime-minister to 
make FTAs an official trade policy. Moreover, there was the fear that an FTA would 
invoke possible economic tensions with South Korea because of the growing trade deficit 
with Japan, as it will be discussed later.  Hence, when it came to real actions, the 
Japanese government chose a rather cautious approach to the issue of having an FTA by 
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favoring other means of economic cooperation, such as an investment treaty. In these 
circumstances, although the norm of bilateral trade liberalization found its momentum in 
the JKFTA, it did not result in the development of a comprehensive full fledged FTA.  
 
4.1.3. FTA proposal from Singapore 
Singapore was the third country that proposed Japan to establish an FTA in 1999. 
The fact that Japan did not refuse to accept proposals from South Korea and Mexico and 
started several non-governmental studies with them meant that Japanese bureaucrats 
approved the idea of discriminative trade agreements and changes in the traditional trade 
policy based on the strict observance of the Article 1 of GATT. This attitude was signal 
for Singapore that Japan was open for discussions about having a bilateral trade 
agreement.35  
Singapore approached Japan with an FTA proposal several times through 
different government channels. The first time was in June 1999, when Singapore’s 
Ambassador to Japan expressed the idea of an FTA between the two countries. The 
second time was in August 1999, when Singapore’s Prime-Minister suggested having an 
FTA to the mission from the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry.36 However, the 
first reaction from Japanese bureaucrats to Singapore’s initiative was skeptical due to 
several reasons. First, most of the government officials from MITI and MOFA were 
hesitant about pursuing bilateral trade liberalization in general, because of the 
commitments to the multilateral trade liberalization framework.37 Second, some others 
did not find an FTA with Singapore beneficial for Japan as it would bring small gains due 
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to the fact that Singapore had already a status of an open port.38 Third, some bureaucrats 
from MITI and MOFA thought that this agreement might weaken ASEAN unity, as 
Singapore was a member of ASEAN, which Japan had supported for many years.39 Thus, 
the FTA proposal from Singapore, met initial resistance from Japanese bureaucrats, just 
as in the case of Mexico’s FTA proposal.  
 
To conclude, by 1998, Japan faced changes in the world trade order, where most 
of the developed countries followed the rules of discriminative trade liberalization on 
both bilateral and regional basis together with the widely excepted norm of non-
discrimination based on the Article 1 GATT. These circumstances prompted the 
bureaucrats from MITI to reconsider the possibility of changes in the trade policy which 
in fact was not following this world trend. Moreover, FTA proposals from Mexico, South 
Korea and Singapore called for such changes. On the other hand, MOFA and MAFF were 
not eager to put forward this idea quickly and were reluctant to accept FTA offers from 
other countries. They seemed to fear that the traditional normative practice of multilateral 
trade liberalization would be undermined significantly and would involve changes in 
other domestic policies, such as agriculture, and raise new issues in economic relations 
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4.2. Adaptation of the norm of bilateral trade liberalization by Japan: the first FTA 
with Singapore 
 Singapore’s FTA proposal gave an opportunity for Japanese policy makers to 
recognize the suitability of the new norm of discriminative trade with conventional trade 
practice and to break the resistance of the bureaucrats from MOFA and MAFF to the 
implementation of this norm.  
 
4.2.1. Negotiation process 
As shown in the previous part, initially Japanese bureaucrats were hesitant 
towards Singapore’s FTA proposal. Only through series of intensive exchanges with 
Singaporean officials and academics in the first half of November 1999, did Japan ease 
its negative stance toward the FTA. 40  During discussions, Singapore’s government 
seemed to take into account Japan’s “fears” of changes in the traditional trade principles 
and made it clear that it was pursuing FTAs in order to provide leverage against other 
trading blocks, to contribute to the global trade liberalization and to achieve goals of 
APEC liberalization of creating an APEC-wide free trade area. 41  Also Singaporean 
officials demonstrated that they aimed “to encourage Japanese presence in the region as a 
way to balance U.S., Chinese and Japanese influence” and hoped “to stimulate other 
[ASEAN] members to actively pursue liberalization and economic reforms to increase 
the attractiveness of the region as a whole to outside investors.42 Japan shared these 
thoughts with Singapore, as they were in tune with its trade practice and principles. 
Therefore, when Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong eventually approached 
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Japan with the formal proposal of an FTA in December 1999, Japan was ready to accept 
the proposal and pursue official study on the feasibility of the FTA with Singapore. Thus, 
it appeared that when the common ground between the new and existing norms was 
found, Japanese bureaucrats agreed to change their reluctant attitude to the new rules. 
Following this proposal, Singaporean and Japanese ministers decided to conduct a 
joint study involving government officials, academics and business leaders. This was 
unprecedented considering that Japan had only non-government FTA studies with South 
Korea and Mexico by that time.43 This move was seen as “fueled by desire to change a 
trade policy centered on the WTO”.44 The Japan-Singapore joint study group had five 
meetings from March till September 2000 and completed its work with the positive 
evaluation of the possible FTA.45 In the study group report, it was admitted that the 
attitude to FTAs can help to facilitate multilateral trade negotiations and be an effective 
tool in trade policy.46 Moreover, Japan sent a Ministry official from MITI to Singapore in 
November 2000 to investigate the activity of Japanese companies there and the 
difficulties they faced doing business in Singapore. He came back with the 
recommendations that Japan should go ahead with the FTA and it should go beyond just 
trade liberalization and include “harmonizing procedures and regulations”.47 Based on the 
recommendations of the Study Group to enter into formal negotiations, in October 2000, 
Goh Chok Tong and Yoshiro Mori decided to start official negotiations in January 2001 
and conclude the agreement by the end of the year.  
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 Moreover, the shift in the trade policy was reflected in the official documents. For 
example, MITI’s White Paper 2000 stressed the benefits of FTAs and Japan’s 
participation in regional integration process.48 The following year, MITI issued a report 
“Economic Foundations of Japanese Trade Policy - Promoting a Multi-Layered Trade 
Policy” evaluating positively multi-layered trade policy, which included multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral trade liberalization, and regarding it as desirable.49  Moreover, 
MOFA also changed its traditional criticism to FTAs to positive evaluation in its 
Diplomatic Blue Book in 2000. 50  Hence, due to the progress in negotiations with 
Singapore, the normative shift towards bilateral trade liberalization became obvious as 
Japanese bureaucrats from MITI and MOFA came to officially recognize the shift in the 
trade policy.   
 In March 2001, the first official FTA negotiations between Japan and Singapore 
took place. The two governments had four formal and twelve informal meetings before 
reaching the final agreement in November the same year. According to the agreement, 
Japan abolished tariffs on about 3300 imports from Singapore, mainly chemical products 
and raised the share of non-tariff imports from 84% to 94%. Singapore eliminated tariffs 
on Japanese imports of beer and alcoholic beverages for medical use and raised the share 
of non-tariff imports from 99% to 100%. 51  Apart from elimination of tariffs, the 
agreement included issues which went beyond the scope of conventional FTAs, such as 
trade in services, investment facilitation, movement of natural persons, intellectual 
                                                 
48
 MITI. “White Paper on International Trade.” 2000, 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/g00W001e.pdf (accessed 05 June 2006). 
49
 METI. ‘The Economic Foundation of Japanese Trade Policy - Promoting a Multi-Layered Trade Policy.” 
August 2000, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/g00W021e.pdf (accessed 05 June 2006). 
50
 Ogita, 2003, 227. 
51
 “Japan, Singapore to Sign Free Trade Pact Effective April.” The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 13 October 
2001. 
 65 
property rights and government procurement.52 Because of its comprehensive nature, the 
agreement was named economic partnership agreement (“EPA”) instead of free trade 
agreement.  
Economic benefits of the Japan-Singapore EPA (“JSEPA”) were insignificant due 
to the small size and openness of Singapore’s economy. Nevertheless, its successful 
conclusion marked a significant shift and created a precedent in Japan’s trade policy 
reflecting changes in the normative beliefs of domestic policy actors about FTAs. 
Furthermore, in signing the agreement, Japan strengthened its commitments to the new 
norm of bilateral trade liberalization and completed the process of changes in its trade 
policy from multilateralism to the multilayered approach, combining multilateral, 
bilateral and regional approaches to trade liberalization.53  
 
4.2.2. Rationale behind JSEPA 
 There were several reasons why Japanese government agreed for an FTA with 
Singapore. The fact that Japan and Singapore decided to begin preparations to the FTA 
talks in the wake of the failure of WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 proves that the 
breakdown of Japanese traditional trade principles and practice spurred Japan’s interests 
to the new normative principles of discriminative trade within FTAs. As a trade ministry 
official admitted, Singapore had obviously increased hopes for an FTA with Japan after 
the breakdown of the WTO talk in Seattle.54 The then MITI’s Minister Takeo Hiranuma 
admitted that the world economy and the business environment, such as formation of 
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business alliances, development of financial markets, information technologies and 
management recourses, which go beyond national borders, were changing “too rapidly 
for the WTO to keep pace in creating new rules”. 55  Thus, to enhance the stability of the 
global system and complement WTO negotiations, regional efforts in the form of FTAs 
would be crucial.56  
 However, despite the recognition of the importance and advantages of bilateral 
trade agreements, Japanese bureaucrats from MITI and MOFA were not willing to 
change Japan’s adherence to WTO principles. They were slowly showing their readiness 
to complement those using FTAs, which include investments facilitation, protection of 
intellectual property rights and industrial standardization, to name a few.  The evidence 
for this is the comprehensive character of Japan’s first FTA with Singapore, which 
includes services, information, technology, education, and student exchange, for which 
reason Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called it a "new age free trade 
agreement."57   
The bureaucrats from MITI and MOFA realized that Japan could not remain the 
supporter of the norm of multilateral trade liberalization alone. Hence, they were trying to 
develop new tools in the trade policy in order for Japan to remain an important player in 
the international trade system. In this respect, the JSEPA provided alternatives in the 
trade policy that Japanese domestic policy actors were looking for, which were 
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mentioned in Chapter 3.58 Japan and Singapore were committed to the multilateral trade 
system as both were dependant on external trade. Thus, they shared the opinion that they 
should form the agreement which would cover wide range of fields and expand it to 
global liberalization and cooperation.59  
Another factor behind more responsive attitude of Japanese government to the 
FTA with Singapore is its recognition of the common ground between the FTA and the 
WTO system, which the Singaporean Prime Minister clearly pointed out. In his interview 
he stated that “Japan and Singapore must depend on the multilateral trading system. But 
we can explore such ideas on the compatibility of free trade and the need to have free 
trade under the WTO. The idea of free trade areas is a means to achieve the ultimate 
objectives (multilateral trade liberalization)…Japan’s and Singapore’s interest is in the 
multilateral trading agreements. This (an FTA) is a strategy, not a goal.”60 Japanese 
government eventually supported Singapore’s vision and position toward the FTA. 
During the meeting between Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and Japanese 
leaders in December 1999 in Tokyo, the then Japanese MITI’s Minister Fukaya Takashi 
acknowledged the importance of the efforts by the two countries to supplement the WTO 
and hence, agreed to launch the study about the possible FTA.61 
Another important reason why the FTA with Singapore seemed to be feasible is 
that Singaporean government expressed little interest in agricultural trade liberalization as 
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its share of agriculture is only 2% of Singapore’s export to Japan. 62 This factor helped 
ease the negative attitude to the FTAs from MAFF. Furthermore, the fact that Singapore 
did not have significant share of agriculture allowed the FTA to cover “substantially all 
the trade,” as tariffs on almost all the industrial goods were eliminated.63  This was in 
strict compliance with WTO rules. Hence, the agreement with Singapore was seen by 
Japanese government to be more achievable in terms of smoother consensus building 
with MAFF. Hisamitsu Arai, MITI’s Vice Minister for International Affairs, stated: “It 
was a fearful and cautious step forward to try South Korea, but since we decided to go for 
the agreement with Singapore, the policy change is for real.” 64  
 The fact that Singapore is the most developed economy in South East Asia with a 
national per capita close to that of Japan65 also helped the process of successful FTA 
negotiations between the two countries. The relevant consideration here was that if this 
figure was much lower than that corresponding to the Japanese figure, then a country 
might look more like a colony of Japan than a FTA partner.66 In addition, Singapore was 
the seventh largest export market for Japan and the fifth largest investment destination for 
Japanese companies. 67  Hence, Japanese government expected that an FTA with 
Singapore would stimulate more business activities.  
 Taking into account, the above mentioned particularities of JSEPA, this 
agreement was criticized in media for not being a “real” free trade agreement. However, 
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facing difficulties with the implementation of the trade principles of discriminative trade 
Japanese bureaucrats had to compromise on the scope of the trade liberalization under the 
agreement.  The conclusion of the first FTA gave legal precedent for the implementation 
of the norm of discriminative trade and thus, influenced Japan’s trade strategy which was 
obviously noticed in the FTA initiatives with South Korea and Mexico. 
  
4.2.3. MITI/METI’s tactics employed to conclude the FTA 
In spite of the fact that senior MITI officials were supporting the idea of the FTA 
with Singapore there were several major obstacles to it within domestic policy making.  
First, MOFA was not eager to use discriminative bilateral agreements in Japan’s trade 
policy practice, because of its strong adherence to the principles of multilateralism and 
open regionalism under APEC framework, as was explained in Chapter 3. Second, 
MAFF together with the agriculture-concerned politicians, “norin-zoku”, and agriculture 
interests groups were strongly opposing any agricultural trade liberalization under FTAs. 
In their view, agricultural trade issues should be negotiated only within the WTO 
framework according to the Article 1 of GATT.68  
Given the aforesaid mentality, the Japanese government was not in a hurry to 
conduct official governmental level studies with Mexico and Korea though they were the 
first two countries which approached Japan with FTA proposals. However, in the case of 
the FTA with Singapore, agriculture was not at stake, and thus, Japanese pro-FTA 
bureaucrats from MITI had to deal with only one obstacle – resistance from MOFA.  
The issue of agricultural liberalization under the JSEPA was resolved without 
even being in agenda for the FTA talk. After Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
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made an FTA proposal, Japan’s Vice Minister of Agriculture Yuuki Tokagi declared that 
the ministry opposed any talks that involved the possible abolition or reduction of import 
duties on agricultural products on a bilateral or regional basis.69 The Singaporean Prime 
Minister, being aware about Japan’s hesitation in pursuing an FTA policy because of 
difficulties with agricultural trade liberalization, did not demand for it and positioned the 
FTA with Singapore as being beneficial to Japan. He argued that as Singapore was a 
small economy, it could be used as a catalyst for further FTA policy development, as an 
experiment that would not overwhelm Japan. 70  In terms of agriculture, Singaporean 
government showed no interests in including agricultural products into the FTA and 
conveyed this message to MAFF in 1999 by sending its representative to the Ministry.71 
Moreover MITI made it clear that agricultural products in which Japan had zero tariffs 
could not be raised under the JSEPA. This allowed Japanese government to include 
agricultural products without expanding tariffs to new sectors.72  In this way, opposition 
to the FTA from MAFF was easily overcome. 
In December 1999, MITI got MOFA and MOF to study the FTA.73 After several 
months of discussions, MOFA officials too came to admit that FTAs could be acceptable 
framework for trade liberalization within the traditional non-discriminative trade 
principles and help overcome discrimination in oversees markets and trigger restructuring 
of the Japanese economy.74 The culmination of the MITI and MOFA joint study was a 
report issued in September 2000, which said that FTAs would be beneficial for Japan and 
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its trading partners, create more business opportunities for companies and more options 
for consumers. It also stated that Japan would strengthen overall ties with its FTA 
partners and, as a result, would be able to increase its influence in the international arena. 
However, the report said that Japan should keep maintaining and strengthening the 
multilateral trade system under the WTO, as its basic policy.75 Although both ministries 
claimed that the study was private in nature, it could be said that the report was a sign 
that the two ministries came to a certain consensus regarding FTA policy,76  as both 
ministries finally recognized and started perceiving FTAs as a real means in the trade 
policy. 
As was discussed earlier, the JPEPA has a broad scope and comprehensive nature, 
which goes beyond the WTO scope of trade liberalization. This fact helped MITI to 
persuade MOFA that FTA would not necessarily hinder multilateral trade liberalization. 
Hence, MITI overcame MOFA’s reluctance towards the FTA, and facilitated the eventual 
conclusion of JSEPA. 77  In the personal interview, Dr.Miyagawa, the former senior 
ministry official from MOFA, who was one of the minority supporters of FTAs, 
explained that he tried to convey the message to the rest of MOFA bureaucrats that WTO 
is good for tariff liberalization, but not for other kinds of liberalization like banking 
services or transportation because it is not quantifiable. He gave an example, that it would 
be quite difficult to standardize banking systems, investment regimes or levels of 
property right protection of numerous countries-members of WTO and quantify the 
effectiveness of this standardization in terms of numbers. That is why FTAs, which 
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include only two or limited number of countries, might be a useful tool in Japan’s trade 
policy.78  
Eventually MOFA adopted the following criteria for a potential FTA partner:  
1) a country should be as close as possible geographically to reduce  
transportation costs; 
2) a  country with similar market and trade system (not a communist one); 
3) a country with similar or close GDP per capita; 
4) a country with similar or close to minimum export of agricultural 
products. 79 
By 2000, only Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong were the most 
possible FTA partners to match the above criteria. However, FTAs with Taiwan and 
Hong Kong were impossible to realize because of possible political tension with China. 
The FTA with South Korea was under study by that time, but had problems which were 
difficult to resolve, such as trade imbalance and agricultural trade liberalization. Thus, 
only Singapore matched MOFA’s criteria at that time.  
Also, taking into account insignificancy of economic benefits of the agreement, 
mentioned earlier, as well as inclusion of the number of non-trade issues, which turned 
the FTA into EPA, the agreement could not be considered as a significantly important 
FTA in terms of trade liberalization.80 However, considering the initial opposition to 
discriminative trade this agreement became a means through which Japanese government 
was able to overcome resistance to FTA policy within its members.  
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To sum up, Singapore was the natural choice as the first FTA partner for Japan, 
and this facilitated the efforts of pro-FTA MITI’s bureaucrats to adjust and adopt the new 
norm of bilateral trade liberalization. The trade agreement with Singapore suited existing 
trade principles and practice in Japan as it excluded sensitive agricultural items and was 
formed as supplemental to the traditional trade liberalization under WTO due to the 
variety of economic issues involved.  In this way, it can be said that Japanese government 
reframed the norm of discriminative trade agreements into a broader principle of 
partnership agreements which fitted traditional process of trade policy-making in Japan 
and did not weakened the existed norm of the non-discrimination in trade. Also, it can be 
said that the normative perceptions of bureaucrats changed significantly from the 
resistance to FTAs to their support as a result of the FTA with Singapore. Moreover, this 
FTA created a precedent in Japanese trade policy, preparing it for further FTA 
negotiations with Mexico, South Korea and ASEAN countries and making the normative 
change towards the FTA policy obvious.  
 
4.3. Deepening of the norm of bilateral trade liberalization 
As was discussed in the previous section, through the FTA with Singapore, Japan 
was able to adopt the norm of bilateral trade liberalization and break the resitance to 
FTAs from MOFA and MAFF. The following parts of this chapter will discuss how the 





4.3.1. Japan-Mexico FTA (JMFTA) 
Negotiation process 
In September 2001, after numerous consultations between governments and 
business circles from Japan and Mexico and during the time when the FTA negotiations 
between Japan and Singapore were at their final stage, discussions on the JMFTA started 
on the level of a governmental study. In November 2002, after Japan had reached the 
agreement with Singapore (in January 2002), Japan and Mexico launched official 
negotiations. Taking into account the timing, it is obvious that after having a 
breakthrough in the trade policy shift as a result of the JSEPA the Japanese government 
was more receptive to other FTAs, including the one with Mexico.  
In addition, there were two main reasons for Japan to reactivate FTA talks with 
Mexico. First, the failure of investment treaty negotiations between the two countries 
spurred Japanese persistence to seek national treatment status for Japanese MNC in 
Mexico.81  Second, the FTA between EU and Mexico became effective in July 2000. 
Under this agreement a few agricultural products, “sensitive” to European countries, such 
as sugar, dairy, beef and grain,82 were exempted. This precedent signaled that Japan 
could also compromise on liberalization of agricultural products during the FTA 
negotiations with Mexico.83   
 The progress of the negotiations was slow and it took about one and a half years 
from November 2002 till March 2004 to complete. A major reason for this was the issue 
with agricultural trade liberalization. The main sticking point was Mexico’s demand to 
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remove 4.3% tariffs on pork, which accounted for nearly 50% of Mexico’s agricultural 
export to Japan in terms of value, and tariffs on beef, chicken and orange juice, which 
represented only a small amount of Mexican export to Japan.84 Moreover, in mid-April 
2003, “zenchu” distributed to LDP lawmakers a petition titled “Requests regarding FTA 
talks with Thailand, Mexico and other countries,” where they rejected Mexico’s demand 
that Japan eliminate tariffs on farm imports from the country.85  Although top officials 
from MAFF acknowledged the importance of FTAs for Japan, they were still cautious 
about the idea to start FTA talks hurriedly. For example, a senior vice-minister of MAFF, 
Toyoaki Ota, said that it might be best not to start FTA talks unless partner countries are 
ready to give consideration to “Japan’s peculiar position on agriculture.”86  Moreover, the 
then Trade Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, who had close ties with the agricultural industry, 
did not support the liberalization of pork in spite of the calls from the manufacturing 
sector  to finalize the deal.87 However, in the case of the FTA with Mexico, Japan could 
not avoid agricultural liberalization like it did in the FTA with Singapore. Thus, the FTA 
with Mexico seemed to be a test on whether Japan would be able to go beyond the 
limited agricultural scope of JSEPA and accept the norm of bilateral trade liberalization, 
which would cover issues Japan avoided in multilateral trade negotiations. 
With the slow pace of the negotiations process, the Japanese government 
recognized the need to cooperate. Before the negotiations round started in October 2003, 
the then Trade Minister Nakagawa met with four cabinet ministers, including Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Agricultural 
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Minister Yoshiyuki Kamei and Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki and they affirmed 
the need for all related government ministries to cooperate in concluding an FTA with 
Mexico.88  However, the dispute over the agricultural liberalization resulted in the failure 
of the negotiations in October 2003. The Mexican side demanded tariff-free quotas for 
250,000 tons of pork, and a tariff-free quota for orange juice.89 Japanese government 
refused these demands and tried unsuccessfully to secure a deal by offering a tariff cut on 
80,000 tons of high-priced pork from 4.3% to roughly 2%. 90  Japan’s proposal 
disappointed the Mexican side and Mexican Agriculture Minister Javier Usabiaga 
remarked, "I was told by the president that there was no need to hurry in reaching an 
agreement if it would bear no fruit."91  
The failure of the FTA negotiations revealed the difficulties in Japan’s path to 
bilateral trade liberalization, which it had to overcome in order to be able to break with 
the limitations of the FTA with Singapore and to broaden the meaning of the norm of 
bilateral liberalization, which was adopted with JSEPA. After the failure of the 
negotiations, Koizumi stated in a news conference “we can’t avoid agricultural issues” 
and we “should spare no efforts for achieving agricultural reform.”92  The then trade 
Minister reported that “although there are sensitive areas including agriculture, Japan 
could not avoid those issues when other countries in the world are going ahead with 
FTAs”.93  
                                                 
88
 “Japan Mulls Concessions In FTA Talks With Mexico: Trade Minister.” Nikkei Report, 07 October 2003. 
89
 “Failure of Mexico FTA a Lesson for Japan.” Nikkei Weekly, 20 October 2003. 
90
 “NW: Japan-Mexico FTA Talks Flounder.” Nikkei Report, 20 October 2003. 
91
 “Cancun Deadlock Gives Japan Brief Reprieve.” Daily Yomiuri, 18 September 2003. 
92
 Hatakeyama, Noboru. “Failure of FTA. Negotiation with Mexico Signals Trouble for Japan.” 11 
December 2003, http://www.glocom.org/opinions/essays/20031211_hatakeyama_failure/index.html 




Another consequence of the failure of FTA negotiations with Mexico in October 
2003 was that MOFA decided to increase the number of FTA negotiators from 30 to 90 
by January 2004. 94  Also it decided to add eight full-time negotiators to formulate 
strategies for individual areas, such as lowering tariffs and liberalizing investments, and 
engage directly in negotiations and assign individuals to particular countries. 95  The 
Ministry planned to implement this program in August 2004, but in the light of the 
breakdown of JMFTA talks, it decided to hurry up as government level negotiations with 
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, which had significant shares of 
agriculture, were drawing near. Thus, the failure of JMFTA negotiations contributed to a 
more proactive government’s stance toward FTAs in general and encouraged it to take 
actions towards their facilitation. 
 
Conclusions of the JMFTA  
In January 22-23 2004, Japanese and Mexican officials met in Tokyo to narrow 
down their differences over the FTA. Hiroyuki Kinoshita, Japanese vice-minister for 
International Affairs at MAFF, proposed a low-tariff import quota for 6,500 tons of 
orange juice, as well as for several thousand tons each of Mexican oranges, beef and 
chicken.96 Eventually in March 2004, both sides reached an agreement. The Japanese side 
agreed to establish a low-tariff quota for pork imports, orange juice, beef, chicken meat 
and oranges (see Table 5). On industrial products, Mexico agreed to create a new tariff-
free quota for Japanese automobiles, in addition to the previous one that covered 30,000 
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vehicles, and gradually broaden this so that all vehicles imported from Japan would be 
subject to the liberalization in seven years.97   
One of the reasons why these negotiations sparked little domestic resistance was 
that the products involved were narrowed down to pork and a few other key items (see 
Table 5), and because the concessions granted would not seriously affect Japanese 
producers.98 Although Japan did not make large concessions in agriculture, the JMFTA 
was the first FTA, which included agricultural products, and it made it significant for 
further Japan‘s FTA policy development. After JMFTA farmers understood that the 
impact of agricultural liberalization was not so big, they felt relieved. Due to the fact that 
farmers experienced the JMFTA and learnt lessons from it, they were able to accept the 
FTA with Thailand, which had more agricultural items at stake.99  Furthermore, in the 
final stage the Japanese government showed its dedication to the norm of bilateral trade 
liberalization, in trying to strike the deal with Mexico, while compromising on 
agricultural products.   
 
Rationale behind the agreement 
Following the sequence of events of JMFTA talks and studies, it was obvious that 
Japanese officials, including MITI/METI bureaucrats, were not eager to hurry with the 
official negotiations up to 2002. However, the international environment had been 
changing in terms of the speed and the number of cases of FTA proliferation around the 
globe. Mexico was an active participant of the movement demonstrating its adherence to 
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the norm of bilateral and regional trade liberalization by increasing the number of its 
FTAs.  
By the time Mexico approached Japan with the FTA proposal in 1998 it was 
already a member of NAFTA and the FTA with EU was about to come into force in 
2000. Because of this fact, Japanese exporters found themselves in a disadvantageous 
position, compared to American and European companies, as they had to pay average 
tariff rates of 16.2%.100 Missed opportunities were estimated to cost Japan 400 billion yen 
per year.101 Also, under NAFTA requirements, Mexico was going to remove the special 
export promotion program, the mauquiladoras.102  Thus, this aspect of NAFTA made 
Japanese companies worry about their future investment benefits in Mexico. In addition, 
as a result of non-conclusion of the FTA with Mexico, Japanese companies were 
excluded from Mexican government’s procurement contracts. 103 For example, until 2000, 
Japanese firms received more than 40% of Mexico's construction orders for electric 
power plants. However, the figure dropped to zero in 2001. In May 2003 the participation 
in international bidding was limited to firms from countries that have an FTA with 
Mexico.104 For example, Japanese companies did not have an opportunity to take part in 
tender for a 7 million dollar medical supply contract and a 1.6 billion dollar oil refinery 
plant construction contract.105 As MITI’s responsibility was to protect the interests of 
Japanese industries, this fact was cited by many policy-makers as one of the decisive 
factors for trade policy reconsideration. Also through the FTA with Mexico, Japan could 
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have an access to NAFTA, Central and South America, and the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (“FTAA”).106 
Given these circumstances, the FTA with Mexico seemed to be beneficial for 
Japan and MITI’s officials came to understand this. Nevertheless, as the analysis in the 
previous section demonstrates, the government was reluctant to go ahead with the FTA, 
stressing the conclusion of investment treaty. Thus, the situation appeared to be 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Japanese government officials from MITI/METI and 
MOFA understood that Japan could not stay away from the global trend of FTAs 
proliferation, as it was loosing its markets, but, on the other hand, consideration of 
difficulties within domestic politics did not allow progress in the trade arrangement with 
Mexico up till 2002. Only after realization that the FTA could be pursued without 
undermining traditional trade liberalization practice and compromising on agriculture, did 
the Japanese government become receptive to the FTA. 
Furthermore, the FTA negotiations with Mexico became important for further 
Japan's free trade strategy and development of the norm of bilateral trade liberalization, 
because this had an impact on similar talks with other trading partners, such as South 
Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.107 "We have to conclude negotiations with Mexico 
(as soon as possible) because the deal serves as a starting point for Japan's FTA strategy," 
one official said.108 The government had intended to use the JMFTA as a springboard for 
FTA negotiations with Asian countries. It had planned to begin talks with its above-
mentioned Asian neighbors in 2004 and had wanted to finalize the deal with Mexico 
before that time. In this respect, the JMFTA was a kind of test for the future negotiations 
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which would inevitably include agricultural products.109 Conclusion of the JMFTA would 
show to other countries that Japan could overcome domestic agricultural opposition to 
FTAs and was ready to move ahead with FTAs which involve agriculture. That was one 
of the reasons why the government changed its stance towards the FTA and agreed to 
complete the negotiation in March 2004. The government was concerned that in the case 
of a delay of the JMFTA , the influence of domestic farm interests would have grown and 
that would make negotiations with Asian countries harder.110  
To conclude, participation in the FTA negotiations with Mexico with the broader 
scope demonstrated a deepening of the norm of bilateral trade liberalization in Japan’s 
trade policy practice. Although on the initial stage Japanese domestic actors were not 
supportive to the FTA with Mexico, Japan changed its attitude after the FTA with 
Singapore and realized that these changes are necessary for its trade relationships with 
agricultural Asian countries. JMFTA became an important stepping stone to the further 
development of FTA policy because of the higher costs and benefits of the agreement, 
which required more efforts in terms of consensus building within Japanese ministries as 
well as with the Mexican counterpart.  
 
4.3.2. Japan-South Korea FTA (JKFTA) 
Negotiation process 
Successful FTA negotiations with Singapore also spurred the actions of Japanese 
bureaucrats towards the JKFTA. In March 2002, after four years of talks and studies, the 
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Japanese government formed an official Study Group of the JKFTA. It issued its final 
report in October 2003, in which it called governments of Japan and South Korea to start 
official negotiations.  
The records of the meetings of the Study Group clearly show that Japan embraced 
the norm of bilateral trade liberalization into its policy agenda. To illustrate, during the 
discussions Japan was very active in promoting the FTA. It intended to end joint study 
sessions and start official government negotiations earlier whilst, the Korean side did not 
accept this suggestion and was indecisive about the time when such talks should begin.111 
South Korea hesitated to start official negotiations with Japan.112 For example, during the 
bilateral summit in 2003, the Japanese government sought a “joint declaration” to start 
negotiations. However, South Korea declined the offer. It had a concern about the 
possible increase of the trade deficit with Japan as the Korean tariffs were higher than the 
Japanese tariffs. For example, according to the results of the official study, “if tariffs are 
lifted, the rate of increase of Japan’s exports to Korea (16.3 %) will surpass that of 
Korea’s exports to Japan (8.3 %). Consequently, Japan’s trade surplus will expand by 
34.5 %.”113  
By October 2003, Japan-Korea FTA Joint Study group issued the report 
recommending entering into official negotiations in early dates. 114  According to the 
official from Korean President Administration, the report helped to convince the Korean 
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government to push for negotiations to begin before the end of 2003.115  In December 
2003, South Korea and Japan convened their first formal governmental-level talks on 
signing the FTA in Seoul. There they touched the issues of removal of tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers, tariff rates, liberalization of the service sector, investment expansion, 
intellectual property rights, competition policies and broad economic cooperation. 116 
Initially, the submission of formal trade liberalization proposals was planned for January 
2005, but the Korean side declined, stating that Japan’s proposal was not sufficient to 
start talks.117 According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry’s official, South Korea offered to 
remove tariffs on 90% of its industrial mining product and asked Japan to remove 90% of 
its agricultural and marine products. 118  However, Japan did not accept these conditions 
and urged to keep the quota for 59 fishery items, but South Korea called for the 
abolishment of the non-tariff barriers. 119  
The negotiations were further delayed by the territorial dispute over the 
Takeshima/Tok-do Islands in the Sea of Japan. 120  Further, South Korea was also 
concerned about the Chinese reaction, since China had replaced the U.S. as the largest 
market for South Korean exports (when combined with Hong Kong’s). 121   In the 
backdrop of the aforesaid disagreements and failures to reach mutual understandings, the 
negotiations were at a standstill.   
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In the circumstances, it could be said that, although Japan and South Korea failed 
to reach an agreement on the FTA, the above initiative was essential for the advancement 
of Japan’s FTA policy. The Japanese government became keen on putting forward the 
idea of establishing an agreement with South Korea, but did not really make an effort to 
start official negotiations until the JSFTA was concluded. However, after Japan adopted 
the new norm through the comprehensive FTA with Singapore, Japan became more 
active in FTA talks, which was evident during FTA discussions with South Korea. 
 
Rationale behind the agreement 
The fact that the JKFTA remained unrealized should not undermine its 
importance. South Korea seemed to be a natural FTA partner taking into account that 
bureaucrats from METI and MOFA were supporting the regional approach to the FTA 
policy in official papers, as was explained earlier. 
 Unlike in the case of JMFTA, business circles did not express much interest in 
JKFTA. Moreover, Japanese corporations were cautious about the idea of free trade zone 
after their experience in investing in South Korea.122 According to MITI’s study of South 
Korea’s investment environment, the major problems were unstable labor relations, 
discrimination against foreign companies and lack of administrative transparency.123 For 
example, South Korea has complicated laws and regulations, which restrict or regulate 
trade and foreign investment in order to protect public health, consumer safety, or 
national security. In addition, rules and laws changed quite often which made it difficult 
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for foreign traders or investors to follow them.124 Japan’s total investment to South Korea 
since 1962 amounted to 13.1 billion US dollars and accounted only for 1.5 percent of its 
total foreign direct investment. 125  Furthermore, mutual understanding and interests 
between Japanese and South Korean business communities were limited. A Keidanren 
official acknowledged that responses from Japanese industrial sectors to the notion of the 
JKFTA were lukewarm because the merits of the accord were ambiguous, and for this 
reason, the federation set up an industrial cooperation committee rather than a free trade 
agreement committee.126  However, the Japanese bureaucrats thought that the idea of 
creating a bilateral discriminative agreement with South Korea can serve as a catalyst for 
improving economic relations between the two countries.  
 
Political considerations 
 The most common characteristic of the relationships between Japan and South 
Korea is that they treat each other as “a close but far neighbor.” 127  This definition 
characterizes the structure of political relationships between countries after World War II, 
which were marked by hostility and mistrust. 128 The legacy of colonialism, as South 
Korea used to be a Japanese colony in the first part of the 20th century, created a negative 
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sentiment against Japan in South Korea.129 In spite of normalization of the relationships 
between the two countries in 1965, the growing trade deficit of South Korea with Japan, 
as a result of the growth of bilateral trade, had an adverse effect on South Korea. This 
became another determinant in the relationships between the two countries.  
Despite the fact that the exchanges between South Korea and Japan substantially 
grew in trade, investment, and personnel since that time, the process of economic 
integration was not smooth. Their bilateral economic relations were often been subject to 
trade disputes and discriminatory import regulations. 130 However, the Asian financial 
crisis that broke out in Southeast Asia in the summer of 1997, spread to South Korea, and 
brought about severe economic stagnation. Meanwhile, Japan was suffering from 
prolonged recession that had begun in 1992. As a result, both countries posted negative 
growth rates in 1998 and this led to an eagerness to restore their economies. Hence, a 
momentum grew in Japan and South Korea to re-examine their bilateral relationships.131 
In these circumstances, political and economic reality of the strained relationship 
with South Korea appeared to be a motivating force for Japan to reconsider its negative 
position to discriminative agreements in order to reinvigorate economic cooperation with 
its “close but far neighbor.” Hidero Konno, the then Director General of the International 
Trade policy Bureau in MITI, emphasized political coalition as a significant factor in 
regional FTAs. Naturally, priority was given to the FTA with South Korea as it was one 
of the developed East Asian countries and as it had indicated an interest in improving 
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relations with Japan.132 However, by the time South Korea approached Japan in 1998, it 
was not ready for a fully fledged FTA because of the normative constrains, as well as 
political and economic considerations, such as the possible trade deficit of Korea. 133   
Furthermore, government officials admitted that the close relationship with South 
Korea was of great importance to Japan to face China’s growing influence in the region, 
because Japan alone could not influence China’s behavior or position.134 Experts and 
government officials in Japan and South Korea claimed that boosting bilateral trade 
relations through an FTA is necessary to maintain competitiveness against China.135  For 
example, trade statistics between South Korea and its biggest partners Japan and China 
(see Table 6) show that in 2001 and 2002, China became a bigger market for South 
Korea’s export than Japan. In 2002, the cumulative amount of Korean exports to Japan 
accounted for 15.1 billions US dollars, down 8 % compared to 2001, while exports to 
China was 23.8 billions US dollars, up 30% respectively. Thus, Japan had to secure its 
economic importance for South Korea in the wake of China’s growing importance. 
Taking into account the above mentioned circumstances Japan was eager to 
develop a new set of principles for restoring strained relationships with South Korea. It 
appeared that the new principles of discriminative trade could be a suitable framework 
for addressing excising economic and political problems between the two countries 
looking at the successful background of FTAs in Americas and Europe. 
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Japan’s approval of FTA talks with Korea shows that Japan was willing to share 
South Korea’s objective to have an improved economic and political relationship 
between the two countries. Essentially, Japan had a need for further economic and 
political integration with South Korea in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and the 
FTA was a tool for deepening the relationship between the two countries. However, 
initially it was not ready to discuss it on the official level but rather took a cautious 
approach to the drastic changes in its trade principles, considering other means of 
economic cooperation, such as bilateral investment treaty. Having changed the normative 
perceptions toward the FTA, as a result of the JSEPA, Japan took a proactive stance in 
the negotiations while South Korea was reluctant to speed up the negotiation process. 
This marked the process of norm amplification, in which Japan was trying to engage 
other countries, including South Korea, into its newly established FTA policy agenda. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
5.1. Transformation of Japan’s trade policy towards FTAs 
 
This thesis has highlighted the characteristics and objectives of the normative 
transition in Japan’s trade policy from the principle that opposed any bilateral trade 
agreements outside of the WTO/GATT regime to the one that actively promotes such 
agreements. In particular, the thesis focused on Japan’s FTA negotiations with South 
Korea, Mexico, and Singapore to emphasize the aforesaid transition and the reasons for 
it.  
The thesis included analysis of the international environment and domestic policy 
structure where the normative shift was rooted in order to make the research 
comprehensive. The background of Japan’s traditional trade policy discussed in Chapter 
3 gave an understanding on how WTO-based multilateralism became deeply embedded 
in Japan’s trade practice, which denied any form of discriminative agreements prior to the 
aforementioned trade negotiations with South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore.  
It was pointed out that several changes in the international environment 
challenged the effectiveness of the norms of non-discriminative multilateral trade 
liberalization in Japan. Among them are: i) setbacks experienced by countries concerning 
trade negotiations within the WTO; ii) regional economic and political development in 
Europe and the Americas, where the countries were actively pursuing regional trade 
arrangements; and iii) Japan’s declining economic dominance in Asia. These changes 
encouraged Japanese domestic policy actors to reconsider the traditional normative basis 
for the trade policy and to move towards a new normative framework which would allow 
Japan to take a more positive direction to surge forward with the changing world.  
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Furthermore, the structure of domestic policy-making was demonstrated as 
another decisive factor for normative change in Japan’s trade policy. Historically 
entrenched differences in functions and perceptions regarding the trade policy in 
MITI/METI, MOFA and MAFF resulted in the lack of coordinated actions among them. 
This was proven to condition Japan’s reactive response to the above mentioned 
transformations in the world trade order.  
Given aforementioned circumstances, as shown in the case studies undertaken in 
Chapter 4, pushing for discriminative trade principles under FTAs Japanese bureaucrats 
realized 1) the possibility of improving political relationships between member-countries 
of an FTA as it enables political trust among countries which would result in expanding 
Japan's global diplomatic influence and interests;1 2) the chance to avoid demerits of non-
formation of FTAs for Japanese companies operating overseas, such as higher tariff rates 
or a disadvantageous investment regime compared to the companies from countries 
which are already members of  FTAs; and 3) the possibility of achieving deeper 
economic integration with countries in terms of increasing the volume of investments, 
technological cooperation, movement of people, among others. However, in spite of 
understanding these benefits, Japan was reluctant to any speedy alteration of its 
traditional trade principles. This reluctance was highlighted by the lengthy negotiations 
with Mexico and South Korea as shown in Chapter 4. 
The case studies demonstrated that the FTA policy in Japan was initiated by ideas 
of a few trade bureaucrats who questioned the existing principles of international trade in 
Japan. However, normative constrains of traditional trade practice hindered the process of 
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the trade policy change.  During the initial stages of FTA policy development, Japanese 
government was not eager to push forward FTAs with South Korea, Mexico and 
Singapore. In the case of JMFTA, MITI was initially lukewarm to developing FTA 
initiatives but this made the MITI bureaucrats recognize the need to modify Japan’s 
traditional trade policy through consultations with Keidanren. This, in turn, helped 
change the perceptions of key policymakers within trade bureaucracy.2 In the case of 
JKFTA, South Korea was politically and strategically important for Japan, as the FTA 
would mark renewed political and economic relationships between the two countries. 
However, Japan took a cautious approach to the issue and the development of the FTA 
idea did not progress further than non-governmental studies. In the case of Singapore’s 
FTA initiative, Japan was also not enthusiastic about it initially. Even though the above 
mentioned FTA initiatives spurred the interests of MITI bureaucrats they alone could not 
go ahead with the deals without support from MOFA and MAFF where the idea of 
bilateral trade agreements met opposition. They feared that FTAs would undermine 
existing principles and practices of non-discriminative multilateral trade liberalization 
and affect domestic agricultural policy adversely. This resulted in Japan’s reluctant 
response to the FTA proposals from other countries and determined reactive nature of its 
trade policy.  
The next stage of Japan’s trade policy development, which can be described as a 
norm adjustment, came with the official FTA proposal from Singapore in November 
1999. With this agreement, MITI was able to tackle the above mentioned ideological and 
material opposition from MOFA and MAFF towards FTAs and make them more 
receptive to the discrimiantive principle in trade policy. For this purpose, the FTA was 
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reframed into an EPA, with a scope broader than that of an FTA, which included issues 
like investment facilitation, technical cooperation, and human resource exchange. This 
measure made the agreement comprehensive in nature, beyond the scope of WTO 
liberalization. This fact helped convince FTA-hesitant bureaucrats that FTAs can be 
complementary to trade liberalization under WTO rules. Furthermore, the issue of 
agricultural liberalization was purposely avoided in the agreement. This convinced 
MAFF that agricultural trade liberalization could be compromised in the FTA without 
breaching WTO rules.  
Furthermore, the successful negotiations and conclusion of the FTA with 
Singapore brought about a significant shift in normative perceptions of Japan’s domestic 
policy actors from MITI and MOFA. Moreover, they became more active in promoting 
principles of bilateral and regional trade liberalization. This process can be clearly seen 
on the progress of FTA initiatives with South Korea and Mexico, which marked the final 
stage of the norm development – deepening the norm into existing policy practice. 
Indeed, after 2002, Japan undertook an active position in negotiations with South Korea 
and was interested to strike the trade deal with Mexico, in order to be able to pursue 
further the FTA policy with Asian countries. 
To conclude, the above mentioned process of FTA policy formation in Japan 
demonstrates that changes in the international environment or domestic politics alone did 
not result directly in the trade policy shift. Normative factor affected the way Japan 
conducted its trade policy because it provided a legitimate basis for the trade policy 
change. However, it was only when Japanese domestic policy actors realized that FTAs 
would not be inconsistent with domestic trade principles and practices based on the non-
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discriminative trade liberalization within GATT/WTO rules, that Japan reduced its 
wariness towards FTAs. 
 
5.2. Prospects for further research 
The research undertaken by this thesis shows how Japan’s first FTA initiatives 
with Mexico, Korea and Singapore, contributed the most to the changes of perceptions of 
domestic actors about economic and political benefits of FTAs and as a result was 
instrumental in reshaping Japan’s policy on international trade with other nations on 
mutually beneficial terms not restricted by the GATT/WTO regime. However, these are 
not the only FTA initiatives Japan has taken. Japan currently has an FTA with Malaysia 
and has reached basic agreements with Thailand and the Philippines. It is also currently 
negotiating FTAs with ASEAN and Indonesia. These free trade arrangements too have 
played an important role in shaping Japan’s trade policy as some issues involved in these 
FTAs posed stiff challenges for domestic policy-makers. For example, the FTA with the 
Philippines involved the issue of allowing foreign workers, nurses and care workers, into 
Japan in spite of opposition from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. The FTA 
with Thailand involved larger amount of agriculture for liberalization. 
 In the circumstances, in order to advance the study undertaken by this thesis it is 
important to conduct further research to investigate how the aforesaid  FTA initiatives not 
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APPENDICES      
  
 
     
  
Table 1.      
  
Japanese exports in the world export share, 1955-1983   
  
      
  
As a share of  1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1982* 
Exports in total, % 2.40 3.60 5.10 6.90 7.10 7.10 9.10 
Exports of manufactures, 
%  4.2 5.9 8.1 10 11.3 11.8 12.5 
Exports of machinery, % 1.7 3.9 6.7 9.8 12.5 16.3 18.4 
      
  
* Figure 1983      
  
      
  
Source: Bank of Japan, Kokusai hikaku tokei (International Comparative Statistics), Tokyo, various issues, cited in 
Komiya, Ryutaro, and Motoshige Itoh. "Japan's International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955-1984." In The Political 
Economy of Japan, Volume 2: The Changing International Context, edited by Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. 
Okimoto. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988, 174. 
 
 
      
  
      
  
Table. 2      
  
Japan's GNP growth, 1957-1984     
  
     
  
  1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1981 1984 
USD, billions 30.8 52.8 115 300.1 693.5 1139.2 1261 
        
Source: Bank of Japan, Kokusai hikaku tokei (International Comparative Statistics), Tokyo, various issues, cited in 
Komiya, Ryutaro, and Motoshige Itoh. "Japan's International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955-1984." In The Political 
Economy of Japan, Volume 2: The Changing International Context, edited by Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. 





Table 3.  
            
Japan's trade  1950-1998, (USD, Millions) 
        
  1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 
World                           
Export 
        
820.00  
     
2,011.00  
     
4,055.00  
       
8,452.00  
     
19,318.00  
       
55,753.00  
     
129,807.00  
     
175,638.00  
     
286,948.00  
     
442,937.00  
     
410,872.00  
     
420,896.00  
     
387,958.00  
Import  
        
974.00  
     
2,471.00  
     
4,491.00  
       
8,169.00  
     
18,881.00  
       
57,863.00  
     
140,528.00  
     
129,539.00  
     
234,799.00  
     
336,094.00  
     
349,124.00  
     
349,124.00  
     
280,505.00  
Total 
     
1,794.00  
     
4,482.00  
     
8,546.00  
     
16,621.00  
     
38,199.00  
     
113,616.00  
     
270,335.00  
     
305,177.00  
     
521,747.00  
     
779,031.00  
     
759,996.00  
     
770,020.00  
     
668,463.00  
Trade balance 
-       
154.00  
-       
460.00  
-       
436.00  
          
283.00  
          
437.00  
-         
2,110.00  
       
10,721.00  
       
46,099.00  
       
52,149.00  
     
106,843.00  
       
61,748.00  
       
72,772.00  
     
107,453.00  
US                           
Export 
        
179.00  
        
449.00  
     
1,083.00  
       
2,479.00  
       
5,940.00  
       
11,149.00  
       
31,367.00  
       
65,278.00  
       
90,322.00  
     
120,859.00  
     
111,855.00  
     
117,092.00  
     
118,429.00  
% of total export 
          
21.80  
          
22.30  
          
26.70  
            
29.30  
            
30.70  
              
20.00  
              
24.20  
              
37.20  
              
31.50  
              
27.30  
              
27.20  
              
27.80  
              
30.50  
Import  
        
427.00  
        
773.00  
     
1,545.00  
       
2,366.00  
       
5,560.00  
       
11,608.00  
       
24,408.00  
       
25,793.00  
       
52,369.00  
       
75,408.00  
       
79,376.00  
       
75,693.00  
       
67,026.00  
% of total import 
          
43.80  
          
31.30  
          
34.40  
            
29.00  
            
29.40  
              
20.10  
              
17.40  
              
19.90  
              
22.30  
              
22.40  
              
22.70  
              
21.70  
              
23.90  
Total trade 
        
628.00  
     
1,244.00  
     
2,655.00  
       
4,874.00  
     
11,531.00  
       
22,777.00  
       
55,799.00  
       
91,108.00  
     
142,722.00  
     
196,294.00  
     
191,258.00  
     
192,813.00  
     
185,486.00  
% of total trade 
          
35.00  
          
27.80  
          
31.10  
            
29.30  
            
30.20  
              
20.00  
              
20.60  
              
29.90  
              
27.40  
              
25.20  
              
25.20  
              
25.00  
              
27.70  
Trade balance 
-       
248.00  
-       
324.00  
        
462.00  
          
113.00  
          
380.00  
-           
459.00  
         
6,959.00  
       
39,485.00  
       
37,953.00  
       
45,451.00  
       
32,479.00  
       
41,399.00  
       
51,403.00  
East Asia                           
Export 
        
254.00  
        
424.00  
        
863.00  
       
1,794.00  
       
4,595.00  
       
13,632.00  
       
33,383.00  
       
42,275.00  
       
87,978.00  
     
186,546.00  
     
174,262.00  
     
170,840.00  
     
128,666.00  
% of total export 
          
31.00  
          
23.60  
          
21.30  
            
21.20  
            
23.80  
              
24.40  
              
25.70  
              
24.10  
              
30.70  
              
42.10  
              
42.40  
              
40.60  
              
33.20  
Import  
        
215.00  
        
520.00  
        
636.00  
       
1,288.00  
       
2,692.00  
       
10,261.00  
       
31,396.00  
       
33,041.00  
       
62,428.00  
     
115,519.00  
     
122,855.00  
     
117,680.00  
       
98,014.00  
 
% of total import 
          
22.00  
          
21.00  
          
14.20  
            
15.80  
            
14.30  
              
17.70  
              
22.30  
              
25.50  
              
26.60  
              
34.40  
              
35.20  
              
33.70  
              
34.90  
Total trade 
        
468.00  
        
994.00  
     
1,499.00  
       
3,082.00  
       
7,287.00  
       
23,893.00  
       
64,779.00  
       
75,316.00  
     
150,406.00  
     
302,065.00  
     
297,117.00  
     
288,520.00  
     
226,680.00  
 c 
% of total trade 
          
26.10  
          
22.20  
          
17.50  
            
18.50  
            
19.10  
              
21.00  
              
24.00  
              
24.70  
              
28.80  
              
38.80  
              
39.10  
              
37.50  
              
33.90  
Trade balance 
          
40.00  
-         
46.00  
        
227.00  
          
506.00  
       
1,903.00  
         
3,371.00  
         
1,987.00  
         
9,234.00  
       
25,550.00  
       
71,027.00  
       
51,407.00  
       
53,160.00  
       
30,652.00  
Europe              
Export                 -                   -   
        
174.00  
          
484.00  
       
1,302.00  
         
5,675.00  
       
17,195.00  
       
20,017.00  
       
53,519.00  
       
70,289.00  
       
62,927.00  
       
65,502.00  
       
71,481.00  
% of total export                 -                   -   
            
4.30  
              
5.70  
              
6.70  
              
10.20  
              
13.20  
              
11.40  
              
18.70  
              
15.90  
              
15.30  
              
15.60  
              
18.40  
Import                  -                   -   
        
209.00  
          
392.00  
       
1,119.00  
         
3,371.00  
         
7,879.00  
         
8,893.00  
       
35,030.00  
       
48,812.00  
       
49,306.00  
       
44,970.00  
       
39,056.00  
% of total import                 -                   -   
            
4.70  
              
4.80  
              
5.90  
                
5.80  
                
5.60  
                
6.90  
              
14.90  
              
14.50  
              
14.10  
              
12.90  
              
13.90  
Total trade                 -                   -   
        
383.00  
          
876.00  
       
2,421.00  
         
9,046.00  
       
25,074.00  
       
28,910.00  
       
88,549.00  
     
119,101.00  
     
112,233.00  
     
110,472.00  
     
110,537.00  
% of total trade                 -                   -   
            
4.50  
              
5.30  
              
6.30  
                
8.00  
                
9.30  
                
9.50  
              
17.00  
              
15.30  
              
14.80  
              
14.30  
              
16.50  
Trade balance                 -                   -   
-         
35.00  
            
92.00  
          
183.00  
         
2,304.00  
         
9,316.00  
       
11,124.00  
       
18,489.00  
       
21,477.00  
       
13,621.00  
       
20,532.00  
       
32,425.00  
              
Source: Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson. “Japan’s International Relations. Politics, Economy and Security.” London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001, 442. 
        
              
 d 
Table 4.         
 Intraregional Dependence for Trade in East Asia, (%)     
         
Countries 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999    
East Asia, including 
Japan 5.4 6.7 8.3 12.7 11.3    
Emerging East Asia-14* 1.7 2.5 3.9 6.6 6.4    
         
*Emerging East Asia-14 includes 10 ASEAN-members, China (PRC), Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. 
     
    
Source: Urata, Shujiro. “The Emergence and Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements in East Asia.” The Japanese 
Economy 32, No. 2 (2004): 20.  
 
    
 e 
Table 5 
Tariff Treatment of 5 Major Product Categories 
Pork Low-tariff import quota halving tariff: 
38,000t in FY 2005 → 80,000t in FY 2009 
Orange juice Low-tariff import quota halving tariff: 
4,000t in FY 2005 → 6,500t in FY 2009 
Beef Tariff-free quota: 
10t in FY 2005, 2006, 3,000-6,000t in FY 2007-2009 
(tariff level to be reviewed) 
Chicken meat Tariff-free quota: 
2,500-8,500t in FY 2006-2009 
(tariff level to be reviewed) 
Oranges (fresh) Tariff-free quota: 
10t in FY 2005, 2006, 2,000-4,000t in FY 2007-2009 
(tariff level to be reviewed) 
Source: “Japan, Mexico Aim to Put FTA Agreement into Effect in April 2005.” Japan agrinfo Newsletter 




    
Korea's Foreign Trade with China and Japan, 1990-2002, thousand USD 
     
Year China Import China Export Japan Import Japan Export 
1990        584,854.00      2,268,137.00    12,637,879.00    18,573,851.00  
1995     9,143,588.00      7,401,196.00    17,048,871.00    32,606,368.00  
1996   11,377,068.00      8,838,568.00    15,766,827.00    31,448,636.00  
1997   13,572,463.00    10,116,861.00    14,771,155.00    27,907,108.00  
1998   11,943,990.00      6,483,958.00    12,237,587.00    16,840,409.00  
1999   13,684,599.00      8,866,667.00    15,862,448.00    24,141,990.00  
2000   18,454,540.00    12,798,728.00    20,466,016.00    31,827,943.00  
2001   18,190,190.00    13,302,675.00    16,505,766.00    26,633,372.00  
2002   23,753,586.00    17,399,779.00    15,143,183.00    29,856,228.00  
     
 Source: US embassy in Seoul. http://seoul.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/DqzdnsmzjLs4-
Igxac_4jQ/wwwfe75304.pdf 
 
 
